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ABSTRACT  
 
In this thesis, I argue that higher education institutes generate 
significant positive externalities and other virtual benefits to the 
society they embedded in, which often dwarf the direct economic 
returns created. It would be an unfortunate oversimplification to 
throw economic theories developed from the private sector directly 
to higher education institutes without acknowledging their unique 
social values. Following a long tradition of integrating social and 
economic perspectives, I proposed a conceptual paradigm for higher 
education system to cover its social as well as economic role. An 
institute sets strategic intents to live up to stakeholders’ expectations 
and then develops an organizational structure to fulfill such intents. 
Unlike other organizations, a college/university has quite a diverse 
base of stakeholders and therefore multiple strategic intents. Those 
intents may conflict with one another from time to time. Evaluating 
a higher education institute therefore should count in all these 
social-economic intents. A holistic method of merit-evaluation will 
then be derived from this conceptual paradigm.  
I applied the proposed paradigm under a China context and found 
that the distribution of government’s supports is uneven with a 
consistent favor towards large comprehensive research universities. 
University ranking influenced how the public fund was allocated, 



and social impact measured by two sets of mobile internet-based 
data moderated such an influence. I concluded that although 
research universities are the shining stars in the higher education 
system, they are not the whole picture of the advanced and 
sophisticated examples such as American’s enviable university 
networks. Rather, the strength of such a system resides in both the 
celebrated faculties and high-quality graduates, and the diversity 
and inclusiveness of all kinds of schools and students. The support 
of star research universities should not be at the expenses of sagging 
small specialized teaching schools. Hopefully, by applying a new 
and more balanced evaluation method, these small specialized 
institutes would shine as did their large comprehensive peers. 
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CHAPTER I: 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of research university was originated back to the early 19th century 
Germany, where Humboldtian University in Berlin launched a holistic model of 
higher education integrating research and teaching functions into a single hierarchy 
(Cabal, 1993). This idea subsequently spread across Europe and the United States. 
When Charles W. Eliot retired as the president of Harvard University in the early 
20th century, a standard model of research university developed into its modern 
form (Geiger, 2016).  
This model contains two parts: a) A teaching-oriented undergraduate sector, 
characterized by a mandatory curriculum, a four-year long full time learning 
process, and sometimes a provision with on campus accommodation; b) A research-
intensive graduate sector built in specialized professional schools with multiple 
doctoral programs at the core, and often than not a provision of scholarships to 
qualified junior researchers. Under such a setting, a research university plays a dual 
role—to educate undergraduate on the one hand and to conduct research on the 
other. This dual-role model has now been widely accepted and adopted by most 
countries and is often regarded as the ideal setting of a higher education institute. 
Evidence supported this view seems overwhelming, that a large majority of 
globally recognized prestigious universities follow this model. As Bok (2015) 

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wrote, in the US, “the most prominent [research universities] dominate the national 
and international rankings, award at least half of the PhDs, and receive the greater 
part of the billions of dollars spent each year by the federal government on 
academic research.” (p.10) 
Although highly regarded and hugely successful, this popular model of research 
universities is not without controversies. Given that college degree is a typical 
rivalrous and excludable private good, it would be efficiently provided by private 
enterprises based on market competition. Yet the majority of research universities 
around the globe are either public or nonprofit (Epple & Romano,1996;Rizvi, 
2016). Moreover, it seems that research universities tend to expand in size, which 
is somehow parallel to the conglomeration and empire-building process in the 
recent history of the corporate sector. The results may be worse since the check and 
balance from an efficient financial market is absent in the higher education sector, 
and colleges/universities do not have the flexibility in restructuring their 
organization whenever inefficiency emerges because of the public fund and 
government intervene behind it. As Ferrari and Phan (2018) put it “today’s research 
universities mirror corporate conglomerates in structure, but without the degrees of 
freedom enjoyed by their corporate counterparts.” (Ferrari & Phan, 2018) 
In this thesis, I argue that higher education institutes undertake important social-
economic responsibilities and deserve a theory of their own. These institutes 

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generate significant positive externalities and other virtual benefits to the society 
they embedded in. These externalities and social benefits often dwarf the direct 
economic returns created by the same institute. It would therefore be an unfortunate 
oversimplification to throw economic theories developed from the private sector 
directly to higher education institutes without acknowledging their unique social 
values. The conglomeration and other conundrums associated with research 
universities are not reasons to overthrow the current model of higher education 
system, but a motivation to develop a better policy environment to set up a proper 
evaluation methodology and incentive mechanism which fit in the long-term goal 
of providing high quality private goods with public benefits.  
As a step forward to archive the long-term goal, I contain that the origin of 
complaints about higher education institutes, to a large extent, is the absence of a 
well-found merit-system to evaluate the performance of a college/university. 
Measuring the performance of nonprofit organizations is notoriously difficult and 
colleges/universities doubled this difficulty for at least three reasons. Firstly, their 
social impact is far-reaching, both directly through their public knowledge 
generation and indirectly through the hidden improvement in human capital 
embodied in their millions of graduates. Secondly, the complexity in their 
organizational structure is not making the measurement any easier—the multi-
functionality and multi-disciplinary structure makes the measurement constantly in 

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compromising among totally different indices. Lastly, their nonprofit nature makes 
the measurement of economic performance in terms of finance and accounting 
secondary or even irrelevant.  
It is somehow an irony to see that these practical difficulties turn the third-party 
evaluation into popularity. Starting from the mid 1980s, despite all suspicions and 
critiques, university ranking has thrived into a multi-million-dollar business. These 
rankings, often rely on objective indicators of academic publications, deliberately 
put the research role ahead of other social functions of a higher education institute. 
Moreover, it seems that these rankings have been gaining preference from policy 
makers especially among those from the emerging economies with a developing 
higher education sector. The detrimental effects of those unbalanced indices thus 
spread and amplified. Take China as an example. China started to modernize its 
higher education system since the late 19th century. The next century witnessed 
many ups and downs and long halts of the Chinese colleges and universities. Since 
the turning of the new millennium, with heated debates and controversies, the 
Chinese higher education system has experienced a wave of privatization and 
massification, which could easily be the largest one of its kind in the whole human 
history. American style dual-role bi-sector model of research university gradually 
assumes its popularity among Chinese policy makers and educators. The 
international ranking is considered a legitimate measure of university performance, 

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and conglomeration is viewed as inevitable and a premium rather than a discount. 
As I will show in later parts of this thesis, university rankings cut into the Chinese 
higher education system so deep as to affect how the government allocates public 
funds among colleges and universities.  
The fixation has started. Some scholars and government agencies have made 
significant efforts to come up with balanced and fair measurements other than 
university ranking in dealing with the difficulties mentioned above. Noticeable 
examples include the University of Manchester’s attempt to measuring its 
economic and social impact by counting in not only financial factors, but also socio-
cultural and physical/environmental impacts (Viewforth Consulting, 2013). 
However, the limitations of these case-based evaluations are obvious. These 
attempts heavily rely on qualitative subjective measures while the data source of 
these measures is diverse and heterogeneous in nature. It is hard for universities 
from different places to find common ground in comparison because of this data 
diversity and heterogeneity. As such, it may not be served as a fair merit-system 
upon which public fund allocation would be based.  
In this thesis, following a long tradition of integrating social and economic 
perspectives, I proposed a conceptual paradigm for higher education system to 
cover the social as well as economic role of a college/university. This paradigm 
contains two parts, namely strategic intents to live up stakeholders’ expectations 
and an organizational structure to fulfill such intents. Unlike other organizations, a 

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college/university has quite a diverse base of stakeholders and therefore multiple 
strategic intents. Those intents may conflict with one another from time to time. An 
educational institute thus has to prioritize one strategic intent over others to promote 
the interests of its key stakeholders. Evaluating a higher education therefore should 
count in all these social-economic intents. A holistic method of merit-evaluation 
will then be derived from this conceptual paradigm. Through the lens of social 
network theories pioneered by Granovetter (1985), I argued that only when measure 
through the correct indices will a higher education system achieve its full social and 
economic potential. The recent proliferation of internet in the higher education 
sector provided us a unique opportunity to specify some details about the social 
network connecting to a college/university. I proposed that indices based on the 
analysis of the connections through open social platforms can partially amend the 
biases of current university rankings.  
I conclude that although research universities are the shining stars in the higher 
education system, they are not the whole picture of the advanced and sophisticated 
examples such as American’s enviable university networks. Rather, learners and 
followers should notice that the strength of American’s higher education system 
resides in both the celebrated faculties and high-quality graduates, and the diversity 
and inclusiveness of all kinds of schools and students. The support of star research 
universities should not be at the expenses of sagging small specialized teaching 
schools. The misunderstanding and neglection of those small specialized schools 
may well be another harmful side-effect of global university ranking. Hopefully, by 
applying a new and more balanced evaluation method, these small specialized 
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institutes would shine as did their large comprehensive peers. 
I applied the proposed paradigm under a China context. As to my knowledge, this 
is the first attempt to systematically review and test the impact of university ranking 
on public policy making. I found that the distribution of the Chinese government’s 
supports is uneven with a consistent favor towards large comprehensive research 
universities. University ranking influenced how the public fund was allocated, and 
social impact measured by two sets of mobile internet-based data moderated such 
an influence. However, it remains unclear if these results could and should be 
extended to other emerging economies.  
The allocation of this thesis is as follows. In the next chapter, I reviewed the 
critiques associated with the recent development of higher education institutes with 
research universities in particular. I then proposed a theoretical framework to figure 
out the social-economic rationale behind the structure of a college/university. 
Chapter III put this theoretical framework in use and found support for hypotheses 
developed based on this framework. I reviewed and criticized the currently popular 
university ranking business and showed evidence that such often biased ranking 
affected the allocation of public funds under the context of modern China. 
Moreover, I put the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter II in use. Chapter 
IV concluded this thesis.   
  

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CHAPTER II:  
TOWARD A HOLISTIC APPROACH OF UNDERSTANDING HIGHER 
EDUCATION SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
While colleges and universities aimed to educate the elite at the beginning of their 
formation, their role had been expanding ever since. In the past two decades, under 
a context of global competition and knowledge-driven growth, higher education 
institutes have been forced to pivot to research from their traditional base of 
teaching. By this background, research universities increasingly gain popularity 
among policy makers as well as education industry insiders.  
Nowadays, the higher education system is often viewed as a major success factor 
in developing a modern economy and society. It not only plays an important role in 
promoting economic growth but stewards a wide range of social activities. As such, 
large amount of public fund has been poured into higher education sector and 
colleges and universities are now understandably under enormous pressure to pay 
back to society. Nonetheless, given activities that universities excel are hard to 
quantify, government agencies lack a tool to assess a university’s efforts to produce 
socially desirable outcomes. Hence, although policy makers tried hard to direct 
higher education institutes to make concrete and measurable contributions to local 
communities, critiques still constantly emerge regarding the public provision of a 

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private good, i.e., college degree, and the efficiency of higher education sector in 
general since public universities have been visibly larger and more complex during 
the last twenty years.  
In this chapter I propose a hybrid theory of higher education system. 
Colleges/universities take their stakeholders’ expectations as strategic intents and 
function not only as innovation engines but an anchor in local communities. Thus, 
my proposal demands more attention to a university’ social activities that have been 
largely neglected previously. I argue that advances of mobile internet have provided 
us a unique opportunity to tap into the social domain of a university’s activity. With 
the new set of tools, we could draw a holistic picture including both economic and 
social aspects of a higher education institute. I thus propose an alternative 
measurement for a university’s performance based on the conceptual model. As I 
will show in the next Chapter, this alternative has rich empirical implications and 
provides us some new insights into understanding the behavior of universities.  
This Chapter is organized as follows: in Part 1 and 2, I reviewed main critiques on 
unsatisfactory role of higher education sector—all post-secondary institutes in 
general and research university in particular; Part 3 presented a hybrid theory of 
colleges/universities, named Structure-Intent-Match or SIM model; Part 4 
illustrated the shortcoming of current university rankings as a merit-based system 
to evaluate university performance, and provides an alternative evaluation method 

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
based on the SIM model. Note that I am not arguing the new method will solve all 
practical difficulties in a single attempt, but to promote a healthy dialogue of 
developing the desirable solutions to the current difficulties facing higher education 
sector.  
 
1. Public Provision of Private Good 
 
The public provision of higher education has long been puzzling economists, 
sociologists, and political scientists. On the one hand, college degree, as a concrete 
product of higher education services, is rivalrous and excludable. Thus, it should 
be classified as private goods and efficiently provided by a competitive market. On 
the other hand, the majority of higher educational services, both in developed or 
developing economies, is provided by either governmental subsidiaries or nonprofit 
sectors. As Garratt and Marshall (1994) called the college education “public finance 
of private goods” (Garratt & Marshall, 1994). 
Opponents criticized that public-financing of higher education may cause all kinds 
of failures from misallocation of resources moral hazard. The rationale is that when 
higher education is paid indirectly by taxpayers rather than by the direct recipients, 
few would care to spend the time and resources to make sure the proper supply of 
the right quantity and quality of education. Thus, the public provision of higher 
education turning the private good into a “bad public good” (Shaw, 2010). 

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Proponents, on the contrary, justified the government intervention into higher 
education on the grounds that there are positive externalities or "neighborhood 
effects" associated with education (Friedman, 1962). Education helps an individual 
to develop significant human capital that not only benefits oneself but also 
contributes to the community by making one a better neighbor. Advanced education 
fosters greater productivity and innovation, drives the economic growth thus 
improves the living standards of a society in general, not just to those who attend 
colleges/universities. The flipside of this argument would be that higher education 
is qualified to be funded by the government—although a rivalrous and excludable 
private good—to harvest its significant positive externalities at its full potential.  
A third stream of arguments, mostly sociologists and increasingly business ethicists, 
viewed the provision of higher education not a binary choice between the 
government and for-profit private sector. Rather, they count on nonprofit 
organizations, or the so called “third sector” as an important alternative. The 
nonprofit sector has gained prominence in recent decades around the globe, 
especially in the field of education. According to Helmut K. Anheier (2005), 
education is “the second most commercially significant field of nonprofit activities 
in the US” (following only healthcare) (Anheier, 2005). This is especially the case 
in the post-secondary education sector—for all 4,000 tertiary education institutions 
in the US, about 1,700 are nonprofit. According to the 2015 Carnegie Classification 

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of Institution of Higher Education, among the 115 institutions classified as “Highest 
research activity”, 34 were nonprofit while the rest were public universities. For-
profit higher education institutions were noticeably absent in this category.  
All three streams of theory have their own merits and explained some parts of the 
phenomenon. They also share some commonality in the sense that all take teaching 
as the core function and graduates the main products of higher education services. 
Specifically, proponents of privatization narrow their arguments down to the 
efficiency gained by competing on potential students’ preferences. The positive 
externalities or “neighborhood effect” narrative refers to “higher education” as 
human capital accumulation from teaching and training. The “third sector” studies 
often treat the teaching and research sectors independently as two separate 
nonprofit institutions. But when come to the complex reality of a modern dual-role 
bi-sector research university providing two kinds of services with quite different 
economic nature, all three come short of explaining power. 
A bachelor’s degree provided by the teaching sector surely aims to meet a specific 
individual’s need; while the outputs of the research sector, largely in the form of 
academic publications, are next to a pure public good. This confliction of different 
goods then could have transformed into an organizational difficulty that may lead 
to low efficiency of operations. Opponents of public funding of 
colleges/universities then take the conglomeration of public research university as 
an organizational failure and point to empire-building as the motivation behind the 

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massification of the higher education sector. More precisely, was the recent trend 
of university conglomeration a necessity to fulfill their social responsibilities or a 
ramification of morale hazard or principle-agency problem? Higher education 
institutes expand organizations to match their stakeholder’s expectations or to 
embezzle/pile up public resources by complicating its organizational structure and 
making it impenetrable? We aim to answer these questions in this Chapter. 
 
2. The Conglomeration of Research University  
 
I argue that the two kinds of services provided by a bi-sector research university 
are in fact not so different in nature and both are public/quasi-public good. The 
recent trend of conglomeration to build large comprehensive research universities 
could be a natural result of lacking a proper mechanism to allocate public support 
to higher education institutes. It is therefore dubious to simply conclude the recent 
conglomeration trend as a manifestation of attention-seeking managements’ hubris.  
The teaching sector delivers human capital as a quasi-public good. The proliferation 
of tertiary education peddled the exploration of professionals who derive their 
legitimacy and authority from formal education and claims to act in specific 
knowledge domains (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Specialization and accumulated 
human capital serve as the centerpiece of modern economic growth theory (Romer, 
1990). Human capital therefore totally fit into the narrative of quasi-public good 

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with positive externalities. Academic performance is the cornerstone of a 
university’s reputation and is increasingly an important attraction of financial 
supports from public and private sponsors (Salmi, 2009). The research sector 
creates a whole set of new knowledge, which distinguish a research university from 
a teaching school. Knowledge creation in the academia is verified and recognized 
by the process of peer review and journal publication. Knowledge created in a 
research university is therefore the next to a pure public good, since it is neither 
rivalrous nor excludable to third parties.  
Both human capital and knowledge creation present positive externalities which 
justified the public provision or tax-exempt status of nonprofits. The evidence of 
higher education system helps to drive economic growth and to develop a sound 
social-political system is abundant. It is actually a common practice to use 
educational years as a proxy to measure human capital in the economic growth 
literature (Glomm & Ravikumar, 1992). Moreover, higher education is provided 
and consumed locally for the most part of history and remains largely non-tradable 
in today’s globalized world economy. It is therefore arguable that the positive 
externalities of higher education system remain local—detained to a great extent 
within a sovereignty border. Thus, a bi-sector research university serves as a perfect 
model of “think global, act local” with academic publication to contribute to 
universal knowledge while high quality graduates serve the local economy.  

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However, the rationale behind the integration model of including two sectors under 
one roof remains unclear. The double mission of training young adults and 
conducting high level research can be fulfilled in a renowned research university, it 
surely can also be met by two separate institutions dedicated to teaching and to 
research respectively. Then how should we interpret the prevailing bi-sector model 
of a research university? I argue that this integration model serves a research 
university better than two separate entities whenever the synergy between the 
teaching and research sectors is substantial. On the one hand, the publication of 
high-quality research papers signal to a wide audience about the superior quality of 
university faculty and help the university to build a good reputation and positive 
image which benefits the teaching sector. On the other hand, a constant supply of 
well-educated young population helps to boost the growth of local economy and 
potentially secures more public support or private donation to the university.  
Besides the obvious synergy, a subtle argument would be to view the bi-sector 
structure of a university as an intensive social network embedded in local 
community, rather than an organizational hierarchy with rigid fiat regime. 
Granovetter (1985) famously suggested that all organizations are necessarily 
embedded in a network of personal relations, and the atomized view of “market vs. 
firm” portraited by neoclassical economists are “nonexistent in economic life” 
(Granovetter, 1985). He then interpreted the effect of internalization is to build “an 

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even denser web of social relations than had occurred between previously 
independent market entities.” (Granovetter, 1985) This narrative fits in the context 
of research university well, as two rather autonomous sectors seeking to build closer 
interactions through more connections, which renders the integration versus 
separation argument irrelevant.   
Many and more could be archived through such a dense network. Be aware that the 
outputs of academia require a certain level of relevant knowledge to comprehend 
and communicate. As succinctly summarized by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) that 
“shared knowledge and expertise is essential for communication”. Research 
faculties often connect to their peers from other universities closer than their 
relations with members of the local community. As a result, local communities may 
not be aware of what is going on in a research lab of a university and hardly 
informed about its academic achievements. This missing link between sophisticated 
research and the local community, however, can be somewhat reconnected through 
the teaching branch. In other words, the teaching branch benefits from the 
knowledge transfer from the research sector while the latter benefit the connection 
with the former by reducing the communication barrier with the local community. 
A bi-sector structure is therefore a socially and economically favorable choice.  
Nonetheless, as shown in the process of higher education massification in China 
and other countries, costs of conglomeration increase significantly for a bi-sector 
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research university. Ferrari and Phan (2018) viewed a university as a conglomerate 
with multiple strategic business units including undergraduate colleges, research 
divisions, and other specialized schools. Inefficiencies may arise because of the 
“carrying” of nonprofit units by profitable ones. Facing the unconventional 
competitor such as the growth of online learning, the authors asked, “complex 
business combinations have been unwinding for years. Will the bell toll for 
universities?” Under a bi-sector model, this question would be why would an often-
profit-making undergraduate sector have to carry a volatile and unrelated research-
intensive sector? 
Although that large comprehensive research universities steal much of the limelight, 
higher education institutes specialize in particular discipline or focus their structure 
on the teaching sector are not rare. Plus, some of them are highly regarded and 
prevail in their specialization and focused area. Compared with their large peer 
institutes, it is even harder for an outside observer to fairly and objectively evaluate 
these specialized school’s social merits. In the following, I attempt to develop a 
holistic approach to address, at least partially, these theoretical challenges listed 
above.  
 
3. A Holistic Approach: Structure-Intent-Match Model 
 
In this section propose a holistic conceptual framework of higher education 

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institutes which count in multi features and options associated with a 
college/university. Under this framework, a university states its strategic intent to 
match its stakeholders’ expectations. Like any other economic organizations, a 
university establishes its structure to best fulfill the stated strategic intent. Unlike 
other economic organizations, a university has quite a diverse base of stakeholders 
and therefore multiple strategic intents. Those intents may conflict with one another 
from time to time. An educational institute thus has to prioritize one strategic intent 
over others to promote the interests of its key stakeholders. 
a) Strategic Intent 
The term “strategic intent” was coined by Hamel and Prahalad in their award-
winning article published in Harvard Business Review in 1989. They proposed this 
idea base on a comparison between western companies and their Japanese peers, 
that often than not, the former focus on trimming their ambitions to match their 
capabilities while the latter leverage their resources or develop/acquire new 
capabilities to match their ambitions. The authors called the ambitions that those 
Japanese firms aim to achieve their strategic intents. Colleges and universities are 
never short of powerful and enlightening visions. A proud graduate of Stanford 
could cite its motto “Die Luft der Freiheit weht”; Yale faculty would say “ אורים  
ותמים ; and “
 	” had been tattooed into a rock at the center of 
the entrance of Tsinghua University. However, judged by the standards of a 
qualified strategic intents listed by Hamel and Prahalad (1989), these nicely put 
visions are all too vague and not implementable. This vagueness serves as one of 
the prominent factors that universities were called organized anarchies (Cohen,et 
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al, 1972). Because of the vagueness of organization preferences, higher education 
institutes are “a loose collection of ideas than as a coherent structure” (Cohen, et 
al., 1972).  
I argue that colleges and universities are in general pursue two kinds of strategic 
intents. The first kind is economic influences which basically contains two related 
goals, i.e., economic sustainability and profitability. Like many organizations, a 
higher education institute must maintain a long-term sustainable economic formula 
to survive and thrive. Although profitability is often not on the top of a 
college/university’s mission statement, financial loss is for sure something 
unfavorable. Sustainability and profitability are broadly related, but the former is 
often a long-term strategy while profitability may have a short-term impulse in 
nature. Conflicts thus may surface from time to time, especially in an unfavorable 
external economic environment. 
The second kind, to many higher education institutes also the more important kind 
of strategic intents, is social impacts. That is, to maximize a college/university’s 
impact on a society beyond its campus through teaching and research. I argue that 
social impacts have three main components, namely, economic externality, social 
footprint, and active connections. As mentioned above, higher education institutes 
generate large positive externalities through publications of basic research and 
accumulation of high-quality labor force1. Social footprint captures the idea that to 
what extent a college/university touches the society it embedded in—how many 

 Here I categorize economic externalities as social impacts, since that by definition, externalities are 
spillovers that affects environment surrounds an organization.




individuals, organizations, and families have had been deeply touched by a campus, 
and how deep have had they been touched. Active connections summarize the on-
going interactions between a college/university and its audiences inside and outside 
its campus. Together, these three components capture a college/university’s active 
base and its lingering effects on society. 
 
b) Organizational Structure  
A college/university then adopts suitable organizational features to support its 
strategic intent. The laundry list for structural features includes for-profit vs. 
nonprofit, public vs. private, research/teaching/dual-role, specialized/ 
comprehensive. For instance, a combination of public, dual-role, comprehensive 
(i.e., research university) is a good structure to maximize social impact; a private, 
teaching, comprehensive structure is proper for pursuing shareholder return; while 
a nonprofit specialized teaching school can be superior in given a really personal 
4-year experience to students. 
Unlike strategic intents which are often invisible to outsiders, organizational 
structures are classifiable and observable. Here I classify higher education institutes 
along three dimensions, that are legal status, sector arrangements, and discipline 
settings. For legal status, one can breakdown all colleges and universities into either 
public or private, and the latter group can be further breakdown into for-profit and 
nonprofit institutes. Public schools receive funds directly from the governmental 
agencies, at the same time orders and bindings come along with the funds. Private 
for-profit schools pursue shareholders’ returns, with great autonomy and 
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independence. Nonprofits enjoy an array of financial support from government, 
donors, and operations, depends on the particulars of the local regulatory 
framework. Compared with for-profits, nonprofits also enjoy a strategic leeway to 
balance short-term returns with long-term goals. 
Legal Status: Public and nonprofit schools play a dominant role in providing higher 
education services for most of the major economies around the globe. Even for the 
liberal-skewed market-driven US higher education industry, private for-profit 
colleges/universities accounted for about 11-12% of all enrollments in 2015. For its 
Chinese counterparts, it was not until the late 1990s when private investors and 
donors were allowed to enter the higher education sector. Before that, all the sector 
was owned and funded by the government. It took almost another 30 years for the 
Chinese government officially recognized the difference between private for-profit 
schools and nonprofit ones in 2017.  
Sector Arrangement: As introduced above, research university often brings 
teaching and research sectors under one roof. The teaching-oriented undergraduate 
sector is characterized by a mandatory curriculum, a four-year-long full-time 
learning process; and the research-intensive graduate sector often built in 
specialized professional schools with multiple doctoral programs at the core. 
Research universities are so successful and obtain so much attention, that other 
single sector schools are off the sight of policy makers and the public from time to 
time. But some specialized teaching schools and research institutes are at least 
equally successful as large research universities, although without 
acknowledgement of university rankings.  
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Discipline Settings: the departmentalization is a key organizational feature of 
modern universities. Disciplines are often packed into departments shaping the 
direction of curriculums, publications, and professional careers. As Jerry Jacobs 
stated, “Disciplines, departments, and majors overlap to a considerable degree… 
The challenge to discipline thus represents a potential revolution in the basic 
structure of academic life.” (Jacobs, 2013) Higher education institutes may 
specialize in a defined discipline, such as life science, engineering, business, etc., 
or operate in multiple disciplines.  
c) Match 
A college/university must structure properly to match its prioritized strategic intents. 
An institute with maximizing shareholder return as the priority should acquire a 
for-profit status and enhance its profitability by controlling spending while 
generating more revenue. An institute to pursue social footprint would maintain a 
relatively large undergraduate program and try hard to match their teaching 
capacity with this large population of students. Moreover, the match between 
organizational structure and strategic intents is not a one direction process, rather 
an on-going two-direction interaction. When a college changes its legal status from 
public to for-profit, it may as well adjust its priority accordingly. When an institute 
expands its strategic ambitions, it may acquire new disciplines or sectors to 
accommodate its newly developed intents. Since the strategic intents are often not 
explicitly stated and are not ready to be captured by outsiders, the explicit and 
observable organizational structure could somehow indicate the strategic intent 
priorities of a college/university. 
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Henceforth, I call the new framework a Structure-Intent-Match (SIM) model for 
higher educational institutes.  
 
Figure 2-1, Structure-Intent-Match Model 
 
 
 
4. SIM in Practice  
From a SIM perspective, a college/university could be viewed as a hybrid form of 
organization that follows both economic rationality and social-cultural concerns. 
This line of analysis is based on a long tradition of socio-economic literature that 
championed by a few masterpieces. Granovetter’s (1985) critique on the 
atomization of individuals’ behavior in both undersocialized economic analysis and 
oversocialized philanthropy studies had gained much attention in the past three 
decades. He argued that all economic behaviors are necessarily embedded in a 
network of social ties, which shapes an individual’s motivation and calculation. He 
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not only used this social embeddedness as an alternative explanation for vertical 
integrations between firms, but further called that “there is a place for sociologists 
in the study of economic life… that their perspective is urgently required here” 
(Granovetter,1985). Social networks are frequently appeared in economic and 
organization studies afterword, with noticeable examples like Gnyawali and 
Madhavan’s (2001) proposal of analyzing firm’s competitive behavior based on the 
structure of social networks in which market players are embedded. The authors 
specifically titled the social network as “loci of resources” and predicted that a 
firm’s competitive behaviors to initiate market aggression or counter such 
aggression depend largely on its position within the social network. However, this 
research tradition also brought vague and uncertain into the often-clear-cut 
economic predictions. As explicitly illustrated by Granovetter (1985) in his analysis 
of vertical integration, that he “use the word ‘pressure’ rather than predict… in order 
to avoid the functionalism implicit in Williamson’s”. This convenient caution, as 
shrewd as it could be, causes some critiques on the less of functionalism or 
usefulness in reality. After all, what good would a theory do if it could not create 
useful predictions to guide practice. The nice sound of social-cultural perspective 
is next to meaningless slogans if not implementable in solving practical problems.  
This is exactly the case in previous attempts to include social perspectives into the 
analysis of higher education institutes’ performance. Because of the social roles 
played by higher education institutes, evaluating their performance is complex and 
confusing. Unlike for-profit corporations which are generally evaluated based on 
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profitability indices or growth, each nonprofit has its own missions and social-
philanthropical purposes thus cannot be judged simply by its face value or money 
collected through fund-raising campaigns. Although an extensive literature has 
shown that evaluating a college/university solely in financial terms without 
counting in its social value would lead to serious bias, no credible and feasible 
alternative has been proposed. In this sense, university rankings that develop 
reputation scores through mass surveys of employers and peer researchers are at 
least honest attempts to reach a practical solution. The organizational diversity the 
higher education sector can only exacerbate this measurement problem. Comparing 
a small college specialized in teaching on specific discipline to a large 
multidisciplinary bi-sector research university is easily skewed and unfair without 
proper control of their structural differences. Ironically, this difficulty hands over a 
substantial growth space to the scoring method upon which popular university 
rankings are based.  
The SIM model explicitly suggests three components of social impact, namely, 
externalities, social footprint, and on-going social ties. To how many lives did it 
ever touch and to how many ties is it still containing, proxies of this sort would help 
to build proper matrices to measure an institute’s social influences. The SIM model 
also indicates a list of organizational features that should be controlled, i.e., the 
legal status, number of disciplines, and that of sectors. I took advantage of the recent 
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development of online social network applications, such as WeChat in China, and 
drew a university’s social footprint online. Such a drawing reflects to a great extent 
a much more precise and accurate picture of a university’s local interactions. In the 
following chapters, I explored the possibilities of this new measurement and tested 
how the social network cushioned the impact of university ranking on public fund 
allocation. These advances combined, may provide a first step toward building a 
fair and manageable platform to evaluate different higher education institutes, no 
matter big or small, research universities or liberal art colleges. While the research 
university model may have rightfully enjoyed its mainstream status, other 
combination of organizational features such as nonprofit-specialized-teaching 
school may also excel. A diverse higher education industry could serve diverse 
demands better. With a revised method such as SIM to integrate social network 
measures into the university ranking, public fund allocation may not be so tilted to 
the large conglomerate universities—small and specialized schools may also have 
a chance to get their fair share of government support.   
To be clear, SIM is surely not the first theoretical model aiming to interpret higher 
education institutes and unlikely the last one to emerge. For instance, New Flagship 
Universities (NFU) developed by John Douglass and others, was positioned as a 
competing model for WCU. NFU and SIM share some commonalities such as both 
taking the social roles of a university as equal to its economic values, both arguing 
that teaching is the core of a university’s multiple functions which should not be 
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ignored. The differences between NFU and SIM is also distinct. NFU, as identified 
in its name, focuses on the top “flagged” universities and spends much of its 
attention discussing how to manage the complexity of a large modern university. 
Although insightful, these pieces of advice may not be readily adapted to small and 
specialized schools. Same can be said to Christopher Grey’s attempt of “reinventing 
business school” and many others—they are particularly insightful in dealing with 
specific theoretical and practical challenges within higher education sector. Many 
of them visionary, yet with significant limitations. A distinctive advantage of SIM 
is that it is more general and could shed light on different kinds of higher education 
institutes. Another advantage of SIM, arguably, is that it stays with reality by 
explaining the observation of behaviors, not unobserved motivations or visions. 
Thus, it is the practical and readily implementable one within its kind. In the next 
chapter, I will put SIM in use under the context of the Chinese higher education 
system. 
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CHAPTER III:  
THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC FUND AMONG CHINESE 
UNIVERSITIES 
 
Introduction 
In 1983, the US News and World Reports released its first special issue on “the Best 
Universities in US”, the ranking business was on the fast track of expansion ever 
since. A by-product of the ranking business was that the concept of “World-Class 
University” (WCU) became the buzzword in the global higher education arena. 
Ranking and WCU have attracted much public attention ever since (Salmi, 2008
Douglass, 2016).  
However, the popularity of WCU was not without doubts and concerns. The 
definition of WCU was, at best, vague. Ranking businesses apply different methods 
and standards to construct their own university rankings. The same university is 
highly likely to rank differently across different ranking lists. This may confuse the 
readers and highlight the fact that there is no consensus about what is a WCU. 
Technically, most of university rankings over-weight academic publications of a 
university, while the pedagogical quality and social responsibility are often mis-
represented. Since WCU was subject to so many imperfections, researchers 
doubted whether this concept would be helpful to improve the performance of the 
higher educational system. 
Although flawed and with many controversies, the influence of university rankings 
has been increasing. This is particularly the case in the public domain. As predicted 
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by the Structure-Intent-Match Model, a higher education institute often pursue 
multi-missions simultaneously to live up with an array of stakeholders’ 
expectations. It is therefore common for it to organizationally structure in a 
complicated way to fulfill those sometimes-conflicting missions. This complication 
makes it hard to evaluate a university’s performance in purely economic terms. 
Rankings somehow fill in the gap and gain a disproportionate influence on higher 
education sector. This is because the government-directed public fund is now an 
important source of a college/university’s income, no matter public, nonprofit, or 
for-profit. And government rely on rankings as the second-best guess of a 
university’s merit to allocate public fund. Research university is particularly 
influenced by this line of rationale, since they are considered as flags to triumph in 
the higher education sector. With public funds poured into research universities, the 
pressures from the government mounted for them to push forward to the very top 
of all kinds of global rankings. In this term WCU has become a self-fulfilling policy 
target. The status of WCU, to many policy makers, is celebrated as the equal to an 
economy’s success in the higher education sector.  
In this paper, I aimed to find out that to what extent the ranking business had 
affected the public fund allocation among tertiary educational institutes despite  
all above controversies. There were some anecdotal examples that had shown the 
mighty of university rankings. In September 2005, the ranking of two Malaysian 
universities felt over a hundred in the Times Higher Education Supplement Ranking 
due to the adjustment of the ranking algorithm. Such a dramatic fall drove a huge 
fire back on the local media, and the vice-Chancellor of Malaya University was 
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forced to resign. In this chapter, I will provide some systematic empirical results to 
show the impact of ranking on public funds allocation among universities in one of 
the largest higher education systems around the globe, the Chinese public colleges 
and universities.   
Surely, ranking or WCU status are not the only factors that affect the public fund 
allocation. Granovetter (1985) has pointed out, correctly, that all organizations are 
necessarily embedded in a complex network of formal and informal social relations. 
Such embeddedness will affect how an individual or organization makes decision, 
and to a great extent shapes the outcomes of these decisions. The impact of 
university ranking on public fund allocation should therefore filter through and 
moderated by the social network where the university embedded. Where a 
university positions in the social network and how active are all the players around 
the university also play an important role in shaping a university’s influences on 
the local community. If university rankings, as they stated as their missions, are 
truly merit-based evaluation systems, such merit evaluation results surely need a 
media to be delivered to its audiences. Under the higher education context, these 
audiences include colleges/universities’ stakeholders in general and government 
agencies in particular. The media in need, to the long history of humanity, was 
solely based on a network of personal ties. At the age of the internet, while most 
personal ties digitalized by social media, so is the merit-dissemination network. 
One surely expects the features of such a digitalized social network play some role 
in shaping the effects of rankings on public fund allocation. Indeed, I found 
evidence that supports such a moderating effect of this newly emerged digital media. 



Specifically, when a university was embedded in a social network containing a 
relatively high portion of active ties, the relation between ranking and public fund 
was stronger than those in a network of a low portion of active ties.  
This chapter is arranged as follows: part 1 provides an overview of the ranking 
business, and how it helps the prevalence of universities around the globe to pursue 
WCU status; part 2 briefly introduces the back ground of the Chinese higher 
education system; part 3 highlights the relation between ranking and public 
resources allocation, and how the characters of social network in which a university 
embedded affect such a relation; part 4 presents the data source, the empirical model, 
and discusses the results; part 5 concludes this chapter.  
1. University Ranking and Prevalence of WCU 
The prevalence of WCU has everything to do with the thriving university ranking 
business, as Douglass (2016) put it “Ranking regimes and WCUs are nearly one 
and the same.” In 2003, Shanghai Jiaotong University announced its first ever 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) which had gained huge public 
attention in a short time. As Qian (2016) described it, “as a response for the Chinese 
government’s hard push for world class university, Shanghai Jiaotong University 
constructed ARWU since 2003. Many European universities are talking about their 
ranking in ARWU, and every Chancellor knows exactly how their university 
positioned in ARWU.” 
Quite a few other universities and consulting groups followed the path of ARWU 
and announced their own global university rankings. Table 3-1 summarized some 
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of these attempts.  
Table 3-1A Summary of Global University Rankings 
Setup 
Time 
Ranking Institute Origin from 
2003~ Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU) 
Shanghai Jiaotong 
University 
China 
2003~ Webometrics Spanish National 
Research Council 
Spain 
2004~ 
2009 
World University Ranking Times Higher Education 
& Quacquarelli Symonds 
UK 
2007~ Performance Ranking of Scientific 
Papers for Research Universities 
HEEACT Taiwan 
(China) 
2008~ Leiden Ranking University of Leiden Holland 
2008~ World’s Best Colleges and 
Universities 
US News and World 
Report 
US 
2009~ SCImago Institutional Ranking SRG Global US 
2009~ Global University Ranking Rating of Educational 
Resources 
Russia 
2010~ Top University Rankings Quacquarelli Symonds UK 
2010~ World University Ranking Times Higher Education UK 
2011~ U-Multi-rank European Commission Europe Union 
2012~ U21 Ranking of National Higher 
Education Systems 
University of Melbourne Australia 
 
While receiving many positive feedbacks, there were strong critics on ARWU as 
well. Marginson (2016) compared the algorithms behind six university rankings, 
namely AWRU, Leiden Ranking, QS, SCImago, THE, and U-Multirank. He argued 
that rankings based mainly on academic publications like ARWU were objective 
and fair, but largely ignored the social roles and responsibilities of a university. On 
the contrary, U-Multirank conceptualized the social roles and responsibilities of a 
university but lacked consistent and objective measures to quantify those concepts. 
He thus concluded that all the six rankings he had studied were rather compromises 
which attempted to strike a balance between applicability and comprehensiveness.   
Douglass (2016) pointed out that university ranking is a zero-sum game: whenever 
a university was raised in the ranking ladder, other university or universities had to 



rank down to make space for it. He also pointed out that Harvard, Yale, MIT, and a 
few others constantly ranked at the top for almost all global university rankings. He 
argued that this may not because of the superiority of these universities, but a simple 
reflection of the dominance of English as the most common writing language in 
global scientific journal publication. In response to the dominance of the 
universities from the US and UK, Russia, Germany, Japan, and a few other 
countries announced their own global ranking to correct this susceptible English-
dominance bias.   
Qian (2016) recognized that university rankings could distort the evaluation system 
for higher education institutes and in turn mislead the educational public policy. He 
argued that “[ARWU] is largely based on the academic performance of a university, 
while the measures for the pedagogical quality and educational results are in 
absent.” Therefore, universities trying hard to improve their rankings tend to put 
their limited resources in promoting academic publications while cutting corners at 
their daily work of teaching. Worse, “[ARWU] covers mostly science and 
engineering academic journals, while social and humanitarian publications are 
rarely included.” This inherent bias towards social and humanitarian disciplines 
could therefore drive more public resources into scientific and engineering 
departments. This tendency could be devastating for an already unbalanced budget 
among different disciplines in the Chinese higher education system. All in all, 
researchers generally hold a mixed view of the global university rankings business. 
As Douglass (2016) put it “Campus rankings are not all bad, but none is 
particularly good.” 
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The Structure-Intent-Match (SIM) model presents a credible alternative to the 
ranking or other scorecard method to evaluate a college/university performance. 
SIM argues that a higher education institute pursues social as well as economic 
goals at the same time. Although economic goals like financial sustainability and 
profitability are ready to be checked and metrics measuring a college/university’s 
financial performance are no difference from other for-profit organizations, the 
same cannot be said to measure its social performance. That is the underlying 
reason why university rankings had gained such popularity, and policy makers 
sometimes took them as the second best to serve as the merit-evaluation-system, 
based on which public fund are allocated. SIM argued that social goals pursued by 
higher education institutes can further break down into three components, 
externalities such as knowledge spillover, social footprint as how many lives had 
been touched by a school, and active ties representing on-going relationships. I 
would hope that by measurements promoted by SIM, much of the bias introduced 
by ranking to the public fund allocation would be corrected. Teaching will gain 
back its credit in helping a society to grow in the long term and schools excel in 
teaching will be rewarded accordingly. Humanity, art, and social science will be 
fairly represented in the measuring metrices. Not only the popular model of dual-
role bi-sector research university will be at the center, but other small and discipline 
focused schools will be recognized too. SIM, with the help of emerging new 
technologies, may start the first few steps toward such a holistic and balanced 
evaluation of nonprofits such as colleges/universities.  
2. Evolution of Chinese Higher Education System and Recent Controversies  
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China has enjoyed a long history of maintaining the public education system. Yet 
the wars and social turmoil in the past 20th century leave a rather weak foundation 
for the modernization of its higher education system. This unique historical and 
cultural combination made the Chinese higher education system a quite different 
one from other major systems. It, however, is not immune to the affection of global 
university rankings. Rather, the Chinese policy makers had actually played as a 
powerful promoter to the idea of WCU. They are one of the first few to publicly 
announce the WCU as their official policy target in their long-term education 
reform plan.  
Another somehow worldwide phenomenon while China in particular, is that the 
mobile internet has penetrated into Chinese society and gained trust from common 
people. Social relations in China, to a much deeper sense than its western peers, 
have digitalized and shifted to online. The Chinese higher education system and its 
interaction with stakeholders, thus provide us a unique window to observe the 
relation between public fund allocation and the influence of ranking and social 
network. This part will provide some background information to help readers 
understand the China higher education market.  
The education system of ancient China aimed to select and train civil servants 
working for the Imperial hierarchy. Classics reading and literary analysis centered 
in the instruction and examinations, which to some extent comparable to liberal arts 
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education in Europe and the US. As Price (1970) put it: “The influence of this 
[ancient China] system in the educational systems of Europe has been considerable. 
The civil service concours of France and the competitive entrance examinations in 
England reflect this tradition. The treatment of classical literature and its central 
position in the curriculum in European schools represent the same kind of approach 
to education.” 
The modernization of the Chinese higher education system started in the late 19th 
century, marked by the founding of Imperial University of Peking in 1898 as a 
successor and replacement of Imperial College (Hao, 1998). At first, the rulers of 
late Qing Dynasty followed Japan to build a higher education system composed by 
three kinds of institutes, namely, general school, normal school, and industrial 
school (Liang, 2015).  After a new republic overthrew the monarch of Qing, an 
American style higher education system was gradually built up and was formally 
named RenWu Regulation in 1922. Under this regulation, Chinese classics were 
almost entirely replaced by imported modern pedagogies. On the eve of the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, there were 123 state or 
provincial government supported universities, 61 privately held academies, and 21 
church-affiliated institutes. A total of 120,000 students enrolled, and the gross 
enrollment rate was barely one out of 10,000.  
The new government of PRC is dedicated to the Soviet Union model and revamped 
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the higher education system accordingly. The Soviet Union Model, however, was 
heavily influenced by the Humboldt Academic System (Kuraev, 2014)2. During the 
1950s, the central plan for national education was introduced, which unified 
postsecondary syllabus and tightened management of universities (Hayhoe, 1987). 
An excessively departmentalized and overtly specialized higher education system 
was established in a short period of time, with only 17 comprehensive universities 
and the rest 211 institutes focusing on specific areas.3 By 1965, a total of 680,000 
students enrolled in 434 tertiary education institutes, a 460% increase in merely one 
and a half decades. But the Cultural Revolution devastated the higher education 
system and the total enrollment dropped 93% from 1967 to 1976. Many renowned 
professors and lectures were wasted in labor camps. The detrimental effect lingers 
until today.  
It was not until the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (Gao Kao) 
resumed in 1977, did the Chinese higher education system started to recover after 
a decade long halt. The system has undergone a series of reforms since then, 
including reforms on higher education provision, internal governance structures, 
financing policies, lifting of recruitment and job-placement restrictions, and 
governmental administration of higher education institutes. The staggering 

2 Humboldt Academy System was named “polytechnic” in the Bolsheviks’ terminology and was regarded as 
the “imperative component of the Soviet labor educational organization” (Kuraev, 2014). 
3 Here is the laundry list of these specific areas: 58 normal universities, 44 poly-tech institutes, 37 medical 
schools, 31 agricultural and fishery institutes, 17 art schools, 8 language-training institutes, 6 athletics 
institutes, 5 finance and economy institutes, and 5 politics and law institutes. 
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expansion of the Chinese economy created a constantly cry for an army of qualified 
labor force. Recognized that it would take years to meet the large gap between the 
labor demand for degree-holders and limited supply from public universities, the 
Chinese government started to partially remove some of the barriers fending private 
investors off the higher education sector. The terms and conditions of private 
investments in this sector were formally established into the Non-Public Education 
Promotion Act in 2002 (2002 Act). The Chinese higher education system has been 
well on the track of massification and capacity expansion ever since. According to 
the statistics published by the Ministry of Education, by the end of 2017, a total of 
377.9 million students are studying in 2,631 Chinese higher education institutes, 
among which 747 are privately-held. The gross enrollment rate increased from 2.7% 
in 1978 to 45.7% in 2017.  
Table 3-2: Major policy changes from 1985 to 2018 
Policy Year of 
Issuance  
Administrative 
Authority  
Main Content 
Decision on the 
Reform of 
Education System 
1985 Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Central Committee 
Expanding the autonomy of 
higher education institutions 
Preliminary 
Regulations on the 
Responsibilities of 
Higher Education 
Governance 
1986 State Council Defining the authorities and 
their particular roles among 
national ministries and 
between central and 
provincial governments in 
administrating higher 
education institutes  
China’s Outline for 
Education Reform 
and Development. 
1993 CCP Central Committee 
& State Council 
Establishing the division 
between a governmental 
macro-management and 
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university autonomy 
PRC Higher 
Education Act 
1999 The Standing Committee 
of the People's Congress 
Specifying the tasks, 
principles, basic 
institutions, investments, 
organizational structures, 
and pedagogical goals of 
existing higher education 
system into law. 
Non-Public 
Education 
Promotion Act 
2002 The Standing Committee 
of the People's Congress 
Legitimize the private 
investments in education 
sector 
National Outline 
for Medium- and 
Long-term 
Educational 
Reform and 
Development 
(2010-2020) 
2010 CCP Central Committee 
& State Council 
Positioning higher 
education in the center of 
implementing long-term 
national social economic 
plan. Aiming to improve 
higher education quality, 
ensure qualified talents and 
professionals, expand 
research capacity.  
Amendments for 
2002 Act  
2017 The Standing Committee 
of the People's Congress 
Distinguishing the legal 
status of Non-Profit and 
For-Profit private Schools 
and awarding the former 
tax-exempt and other 
favorable terms similar to 
the public schools. 
 
The rapid opening up and scaling up of the higher education sector are not without 
controversies. Three streams of critics emerged regarding discrimination toward 
private investors, oversizing and conglomeration of colleges and universities, and 
government-led arbitrarily winner-picking strategy, respectively.  
One stream of critics focused on the deliberate discrimination toward private 
investors, which created significant inequality across higher education institutes. 
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The 2002 Act treated private institutes as “supplements” to public universities: 
while private schools can make profits and distribute profits back to its shareholders, 
they are not qualified for tax-exempt or other financial support from the 
government like their public peers. As a result, privately-held higher education 
institutes are significantly smaller than their public peers with weak brands that are 
not-so-well-perceived by the job market. The Amendment of 2002 Act passed in 
2017 partially corrected the discrimination problem by defining non-profit private 
universities as a new category of education institutes to register and award the 
category policy favors including tax-exempt. As an exchange, any economic 
surplus earned by a nonprofit university should be reinvested back to the university, 
not to be distributed to its owners. But still, nonprofit private institutes are not fully 
entitled to per-student-subsidies from governments as their public peers were, and 
other limitations remained. All in all, the 2017 amendment has yet succeeded in 
changing the prevailing opinion among policy makers that public funding for 
private universities is unfair and absurd.  
Moreover, the massification and conglomeration of Chinese universities brought 
up heated debates over the overall quality of higher education sector. Previous 
studies suggested massification is often accompanied by deteriorating quality and 
oversized university conglomeration (Jung & Harman, 2009; Hornsby & Osman, 
2014). This was particularly significant under the Chinese context. Majority of the 
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Chinese colleges and universities threw away the Soviet-Union-Style central-
planned specialization and rushed into multi-disciplinary bi-sector research 
university model. Peking University, which was traditionally viewed as the best 
social-economic school, established its own engineering school and rapidly 
expanded it into one of the largest in China. Its neighbor, Tsinghua University, 
often viewed as the best engineering institute in China, established its own socio-
humanitarian school and recruited thousands of students each year. Both schools 
now recruit more postgraduates than undergraduates yearly.   
Since the mid-90s, the Chinese government tried anxiously to push up the 
international ranking of Chinese universities by announcing a series of winner-
picking projects. Project 211 was approved by the State Council and the Overall 
Construction Plan was officially launched in 1995. “211” stands for the mission of 
this project: “facing [the challenges] of the 21st century, [we have to] concentrate 
[resources] on building 100 more higher education institutes and a group of key 
disciplines”. About 36.8 billion RMB was allocated as special funds to support 
listed institutes in the first ten years. A more selective version of Project 211, 
Project 985 was announced by then-President Jiang Zemin just three years later at 
the Centennial of Peking University. The goal is to lift a handful of Chinese 
universities into the rank of world-class universities. As of today, 39 Chinese 
universities are selected in Project 985, and all of them are also members of Project 
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211.  
Subsequently, the majority of the Chinese universities has dramatically shifted their 
focus from teaching to research since all these rankings are heavily based upon the 
outputs of a school’s academic research. American style bi-sector dual role model 
of research university regained favorability in the Chinese higher education sector 
after a century-long ups and downs. However, two unanticipated side effects 
emerged. First, given university rankings are often a troublesome measurement of 
university performance, it could misguide the allocation of public fund among 
higher education institutes. Second, over-emphasizing on university ranking and 
academic research put nonprofit private universities in a more disadvantaged 
position—many of them are not qualified in applying national research funds and 
other government-backed research projects, since there newly found universities 
often do not have an extensive track record on conducting research.  
Mobile internet is on the fast track of development in China since 2010. According 
to CNNIC (2019), the total number of netizens has reached 829 million by the end 
of 2018, or a 59.6% penetration ratio in the whole Chinese population. A distinctive 
character of the Chinese internet industry is that it was born mobile in the sense that 
many of these 829 million netizens do not possess a personal computer, but a 
smartphone as one’s first connected terminal. This little fact makes the mobile 
platforms of social media bounced and leaped in China. As a representative of this 
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trend, WeChat, the flagship social interaction app developed by Tencent, joined the 
prestigious billion monthly-active-user app club in March 2018. Unlike its other 
billion user peers which are operating globally, most of WeChat users are local 
Chinese people. A typical WeChat day is structured by 45 billion text messages and 
410 million voice/face calls. As such, it is safe to say that much of the off-line social 
interactions in China nowadays has been shifted online. A large sample survey 
conducted by TRI (2015) had concluded that “WeChat had not only a daily chatting 
app share with all your friends, but a dominant tool to communicate in the 
workplace as well.”  
This digitalization of social network provides researchers a unique opportunity to 
get into the real intensive social network composed by condensed and complicated 
personal ties of all kinds. LinkedIn used to visualize its user’s personal career 
connections recorded in its popular online services. Researchers were unprepared 
and amazed by the vast and complexity of a network of a single person’s 
professional relations4. One can reasonably expect the amount of social relations 
tie to a large organization like a university, could easily passed a hundred thousand. 
It is impossible to record and research such a far-reaching complicated network 
without the help of a powerful tool like the internet.  
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3. Hypotheses Development  
a) Impact of University Rankings on Allocating Public Resources 
Previous studies have shown that a healthy higher education system can benefit the 
society in multiple ways. An inexhaustive list of social and economic benefits 
includes that: higher education relates to high levels of labor force participation, 
employment, and earnings; higher education plays a crucial role in fostering 
cultures of diversity by creating an institutional condition of social inclusion; higher 
education helps to create a middle class which is essential to state capacity and 
societal success; beyond economic benefits to individuals and the wealth of society, 
higher education also carry psychological benefits (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil 1992; 
Baum & Rhum, 2009Lamont 2014). 
Salmi (2009) acknowledged the ranking industry’s contribution to the popularity of 
WCU and posed the question “what does it mean to be a world- class university?”. 
He argued that the membership of this exclusive group of WCU is based on 
international recognition. He listed three factors that support a WCU status, i.e., 
high concentration of talent, abundant resources, and autonomous governance 
structure. Douglass (2016) proposed a concept of “New Flagship University” (NFU) 
as an alternative to WCU. He argued that the NFU model expands WCU by 
referring a university’s relevancy to the local society; while the core of WCU, the 
international standards of excellence focused largely on research productivity, is 
not ignored.  
Christensen and Eyring (2011) added another layer of challenges to the 
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contemporary higher education system. They pointed out that traditional 
universities are now facing increasing competition from disruptive competitors. 
These competitive alternatives provide online courses, emphasizing marketable 
degrees for working adults. To be sure, WCUs and other traditional universities 
have valuable qualities and capacities. But without innovation, these qualities and 
capacities may not be enough to offset their disruptive competitor’s cost and other 
advantages.   
As the most prominent status of all higher education institutions, building a WCU 
is not merely winning a trophy. The preoccupation about WCU status reflects a 
general recognition that the economic growth and global competitiveness of an 
economy are increasingly driven by research and innovation (Salmi, 2009). 
Research universities that create new knowledge and train the professionals and 
scientists are in great needs in a knowledge intensive economy. Moreover, WCU 
with high international recognition can be a magnet attracting talented researchers 
from overseas.  
All above conclude that investing in WCU could be the best opportunity offered to 
public funds preparing for the future (Salmi, 2009). Russia, China, Japan, among 
many other countries had included WCU in their long-term development plans for 
national education systems, despite the critics from academia and public opinions 
(Douglass, 2016). Qian (2016) concluded that “[ARWU] enjoyed a wide influence 
on government policy making, not only in China, but all over the world.” 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the higher the ranking of a university, the more 
public fund it obtains.  
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b) Impact of Social Network on Allocating Public Resources 
It would not be mistaken that, under the specific context of my research, the “social 
network” in general are in no way refer to a personal tie between university and key 
personnel in particular government agencies in charge of public fund allocation. 
Rather, in discussion of SIM model, I explicitly listed two components of social 
impact, namely social footprint and active connections, with the former captured 
how many it is clear that these two components are all associated with 
characteristics of a social network that a college/university maintains. 
The idea of the social footprint firstly appeared in the recent corporate social 
responsibility discussions. The idea is that to fully evaluate the environmental 
impact of a particular behavior, one needs to go through all track records to build a 
proper social footprint of such a behavior. This term subsequently spreads to other 
studies and often refer to the track records of one’s online activities. Here I 
borrowed this concept to identify a college/university’s trace line in an economy, 
capturing that to what extent a college/university touches the society it embedded 
in. How many individuals, organizations, and families have had been deeply 
touched by a campus, and how deep have had they been touched by a 
college/university. I specifically define this trace line of touches a collection of all 
its alumni’s employing record. Alumni as a group, embodied an education 
institute’s contribution to the accumulative human capital of an economy. This 
capital carried by graduates is then disseminated spatially across a geographic area. 
These high-quality immigration labor would easily be the contributing factor to the 
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local economy where they are employed. To recognize their contribution and 
encourage more to come, a government agency would favor those origins where 
these immigrations come from. As such, the broadness of this area implies a 
college/university’s social footprint will be positively related to the government 
supports it obtains.  
Note that the connection between alumni and a college/university may decay along 
time. Freshly graduates may still talk with faculty members who helped them 
during their days on campus, but those who have left school for years, the impulse 
of calling a faculty member will not be so strong. Thus, not only how broadly 
alumni distributed, but how many of them still maintain an active relationship also 
makes a difference. Those who have strong experiences and feelings about their 
days in colleges/universities are often those who still motivated to keep an on-going 
relation. To a certain extent, this ratio of active connections would be a sound proxy 
for graduates’ impression of the institute they graduated. It is therefore reasonable 
to predict that the high such a ratio, the deeper college years touched a person’s life, 
the higher the possibility that public funds and other donations a college will obtain.  
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, the more active the social network of a 
university, the more public fund it obtains. 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, the broader the social footprint of a university, 
the more public fund it obtains. 
 
c) “Increasing Return” to University Ranking5 
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As the WCU status of top research university has been celebrated as the trophy of 
national success by government agencies, rankings have maintained 
asymmetrically enormous influence on public policy. This is especially the case for 
emerging economies, as exemplified by China’s ambitions demonstrated in 211 and 
985 projects. Explanations would be that policy makers in emerging economies 
often enjoyed more power in directing public fund compared with those in mature 
democracies. Ironically the former at the same time often is lack of confidence and 
proper tools to evaluate the performance of local colleges and universities. The 
combination of the lure to grab the trophy of higher education sector and the policy 
leeway to direct public resources may lead to policy favors tilting to large 
established schools. That is, because of the biased policies, public funds are drained 
from a large number of small local tertiary schools to finance the expansion of 
research universities listed at the top end of rankings. As such, one could expect an 
“increasing returns” in terms of government support a university obtains when it 
climbed up to the upper end of the university rankings. More specifically, the 
marginal increase in subsidies granted to a higher education institute would be more 
for those who had already ranked high to move higher. A convex curvilinear relation 
would be expected to the positive correlation between ranking and government 
supports.  
Hypothesis 3: The marginal funds a university obtains from government 
support increases when its ranking improves.   
 
d) The Interaction between Social Network and University Ranking 
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Granovetter (1985) argued that, apart from the rationality assumption of 
neoclassical economic theory, transactions between individuals or organizations are 
embedded in a network of social relations rather than in an abstract idealized market. 
Powell (1990) called such structural embeddedness as a hybrid form of organization 
between hierarchical fiat and arm-length market. Burt (1992) showed that such a 
hybrid institution played an important role in facilitating transaction when the 
transaction cost was too high to form an efficient market.    
In their comprehensive literature review on social network and structural 
embeddedness theories, Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001) proposed that social 
network is a locus of strategic resources, a key component in forming the 
competitive advantages of a firm. An organization located at the center of a network 
or positioned strategically in the node bridging structural holes, could easily enjoy 
a large number of direct ties, attract social attention, accumulate valuable 
information, and participate in more profitable economic transactions. Their 
propositions had found some supports in multiple empirical studies afterward. For 
instance, Phelps (2010) had followed the historical performance of 77 telecom 
equipment vendors and found that the density of social network had a significant 
positive impact on a vendor’s innovative capacity.  
Universities often have a colossal number of social ties within local communities. 
These ties compose a dense network which channels the influence of a university 
beyond campus. Such a network also affects how a university is viewed by the 
public. Ranking signals to the community about a university’s quality, and such a 
reputational signal necessarily resides and disseminates through social network of 
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relations. Specifically, when a university locates in a widely-connected network 
where there are many channels and social ties to deliver the latest news about 
ranking, this piece of signaling would soon reach policy makers and enjoy a better 
chance of reflecting on public resources allocation.  
Not all social links to a university are equal. Some of the ties are more active and 
stickier than others. The reputational signals of ranking are more likely to be 
promptly and self-motivated sending out by the other end of social links. As a result, 
strong and active ties are more effective in disseminating ranking information 
compared to weak ties. A university with a larger portion of strong ties within a 
social network will therefore be more effective in affecting public resource 
allocation than those with less portion of strong ties.  
Hypothesis 4a: Ceteris Paribus, the portion of active ties positively moderates 
the relation between ranking and public resource allocation. 
Hypothesis 4b: Ceteris Paribus, the social footprint positively moderates the 
relation between ranking and public resource allocation. 
Figure 3-1 : Hypotheses 1~4b 
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4. Methodology 
a) Sample and Data 
We picked up the top 500 in the “Best Chinese University” (BCU) list published by 
Shanghai Jiaotong University as our research sample 6. BCU serves to our research 
purpose well for two reasons. Firstly, BCU is a subset of ARWU which made a 
significant contribution to the acceptance and prevalence of university ranking and 
WCU in the past decade (Qian, 2016; Douglass, 2016). Secondly, the Chinese 
government was one of the first few who accepted the concept of WCU and 
included the pursuing of WCU as its official educational policy. We therefore 
expect that the influence of university ranking on public resource allocation in 
China would be typical and transparent.  
Data for sample universities were obtained from four sources. Firstly, the Shanghai 
Ranking published indicators for all sample universities for their Average Score of 
Incoming Freshmen in National College Entrance Exam, Employment Rate of 
Bachelor Degree Recipient,Number of Papers in Scopus,Citation Impact, Number 
of Top 1% Most Cited Paper,Number of Top Cited Researchers in China, Research 
Funds from Industry, Technology Transfer Fees, and Number of International 
Students. These indicators were carefully weighted and combined to form the list 
of BCU, which we cited as the variable of interest. The second source is the Quality 
Evaluation Report (QER) published by the Chinese Ministry of Education. We 

6 Please refer to http://www.shanghairanking.com/Chinese_Universities_ Rankings / Overall -Ranking-2017. 
html for the full list. 
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extracted quantitative indicators from QERs such as Number of Full-Time Student, 
Number of Graduate Student, Number of Faculty, Gross Floor Area for Teaching 
and Administration, Daily Pedagogical Spending, and Special Pedagogical 
Spending. We constructed our dependent variable and moderator from this dataset.  
The last two data sources are unstructured internet-based big data. I took pains to 
cleanse all the noises and recalculate them into understandable structured datasets. 
One is the social media data from WeChat Public Platform (WPP). WeChat is the 
most popular social media app in China. WPP provides tools for organizations like 
firms and universities to design their own official social media account on WeChat. 
There are over 20 million such official accounts now on WPP, which makes WPP 
a major channel to maintain an organization’s complex network of social ties. We 
applied a machine-learning process to tag all public accounts on WPP that operate 
by educational institutes. We took the pain to further hand-wash down the 70,000 
public accounts that had been tagged, to pick up those that were attached to the 500 
sample universities. We then had comfortably confirmed 1,365 official accounts 
managed by our sample universities or their member schools. Finally, we summed 
up different official accounts that belonged to same universities and piled up a 
dataset including Number of Fans, Number of Active Fans, Number of Articles 
Published, Number of Clicks, and Number of Shares for all sample universities.  
The last data is obtained with the help of Mobile Map Lab of Tencent (MMLT). 
Powered by MMLT’s servers and computing capacity, we were able to survey on 
4.96 million freshly graduated degree-holders from all the 1245 degree-granting 
Chinese colleges/universities in 2017 and located their whereabout in this March. 
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We then, again with the help of MMLT, grouped all these roughly 5 million 
observations by the school one had graduated in 2017 and the city one lived in 2018 
accordingly, and matched this dataset with the 500 included in the BCU list. In short, 
the cleansed final dataset is anonymous and untraceable to any specific individual, 
but only an aggregated number attached to 351 major cities of China identifying 
the number of fresh graduates from a particular university live in this particular city. 
Figure 3-2 is an example of the geographic distribution of fresh graduates from one 
of our sample universities. 
Figure 3-2: Geographic Distribution of Fresh Graduates 
 
 
 
Apart from the above systematic sources, I also obtained scattered information, 
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such as tagged those so-called “211” and “985” universities in our sample list. In 
November 1995, the Chinese government announced the “211” initiative to build 
100 WCU in the 21st century. Four years later, it announced a similar initiative to 
support a handful of elite Chinese universities to gain WCU status. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that these few dozen Chinese universities were favored by 
policy makers despite their rankings. Currently, there are 108 and 38 universities 
included in the “211” and “985” initiatives respectively7. “985” is considered more 
prestigious in the sense that all “985” universities are in the “211” list while the 
opposite is not.  
  
b) Measurements 
Dependent Variable: Subsidies from the Chinese governments were the main 
sources of a university’s Daily Pedagogical Spending (DPS) and Special 
Pedagogical Spending (SPS). We therefore applied the DPS and SPS per student as 
the measure for dependent variable Government Support (GS).  
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Where GSi stands for university i’s government subsidies per Full-Time Student 
(FTS). It is clear that GSi is the average subsidies received per student, therefore 
should be free of the size bias and a fair measure to government’s financial support 
to a particular college/university. 
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Independent Variables: I measure the first independent variable of interest, 
University Ranking, in two ways. The first is the position number (N) of a higher 
education institute on the list of BCU published by Shanghai Jiaotong University 
in 2017. Thus N ~ [1, 500], with the higher a university’s ranking, the smaller the 
N. The second way to measure University Ranking is to apply the final score (S) 
calculated by Shanghai Jiaotong University and published by BCU. The higher the 
S, the higher the position a university is ranked. 
I measure social footprint by two variables constructed based on the MMLT dataset. 
The first is a simple count (C) of how many cities a sample university’s fresh 
graduate spread ten months after graduation. The second is a Herfindahl-
Hirschman-Index (HHI) calculated by adding up all the square of the share of a 
higher education institute’s graduates in a particular city as a percentage of the total 
number of the institutes’ graduates. HHI therefore identifies to what extent a 
school’s graduates concentrated geographically. Theoretically speaking, HHI 
ranges from 0 to 1, with the higher the value, the more concentrated the geo-
distribution of a school’s graduates. 
**+# =, (.ℎ0123)53 
 
Where HHIi stands for school i’s Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index, and sharej stands 
for city j’s share of school i’s total graduates in percentage terms.  
I measure active connections by two independent variables constructed from WPP 
data. The active ties (AT) are the active followers of the official account of a 
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college/university. Specifically, among the total number of all fans that follow a 
university’s official WeChat account, there was often a portion that remains active 
in interacting with the account manager through messaging and commenting. These 
fans formed a network of active ties that play a central role in forming the 
university’s social influence. I used the Number of Active Fans (NAF) over Number 
of Fans (NF) as the measure for Active Ties (AT).  
6)# = ∑ 86(3#3∑ 8(3#3 
Where ATi stands for university i’s average portion of active ties over a number of 
j official public accounts. Another measure is the density of network (DN), which 
is the ratio of Total Number of Followers (TNF) to a total of Full-Time Students 
(FTS).  
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These two measures, although straightforward, need further validation. Are these 
two the right constructs to characterize the social network in which a 
college/university is embedded? Are these two measuring the meaningful social 
connections that can be treated as media for reputation, loci of resources, and 
potential to help fulfill a higher education institute’s strategic intent? I conducted a 
series of structured lengthy interviews and anecdotal surveys to find out more about 
those followers of WPP accounts and particularly faces behind those “active ties”. 
I randomly selected 20 WPP accounts officially registered by a higher education 
institute and left a message identifying who I am and the motivation of my interview. 
10 of them replied positively. I emailed them my questionnaire, containing open-
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end questions such as how much do you know about your followers? Would you 
please breakdown your followers in term of their relations with you and the institute 
behind this WPP account? I then, with the consent of the interviewee who had 
already gained full knowledge of my research intent, conduct in-depth interview 
either through a phone call or, in two cases, face to face interviews. The summary 
of these interviews could be found in Appendix 1.  
All of my interviewees are the managers directly in charge of day to day operations 
of the official WPP accounts. Most of them are actually full-time staffs hired by the 
institute to handle the editing load of work. From my interviews, I feel confident 
and comfortable to say that all of my interviewees are quite experienced in 
interacting with their digital fans. Their reaction to my open-end quests echoed my 
suspects that the followers of those official WPP accounts of a higher education 
institute are mainly those who have extensive real-life experiences with the institute. 
Mostly students in school and graduated, faculties, and parents or other family 
members. The content, articles published in the WPP account columns, attracts 
more readers when it is about happenings within the campus. A more substantial 
proof for this is that, after counting all the 1,130 articles published for the top 100 
higher education institutes’ WPP accounts from August 2017 to October 2018, only 
64 of them were talking something completely unrelated to the institute an account 
had attached to. Moreover, the average number of reads of these 64 was about 
17,522.5, significantly smaller than that of the total population of over 27,284.5 
reads on average8. It is clear that followers of these WPP accounts were interested 
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in what was happening within the campus and took this social platform to connect 
to the institute. I therefore feel safe to state that these followers of an institute’s 
WPP account are those who matter, and characterizes the digital social network 
surrounds this institute.  
Control Variables: Besides university ranking, many other factors may play a role 
in affecting the allocation of public resources. For example, a university with a large 
capacity to recruit local students may gain the favor of local communities and 
governments. I therefore included Gross Floor Area (GFA) for Teaching and 
Administration as the control variable. Moreover, Chinese universities can roughly 
be categorized into two groups, i.e., research university or teaching university. The 
former has a large number of postgraduate students, while the latter has a few or no 
postgraduate programs. More importantly, the former often enjoys direct subsidies 
such as research funds from the government, while the latter has a few or none. I 
then included two controls, Number of Graduate Student over Number of Full-Time 
Student (NGS/FTS) and Number of Faculty over Number of Full-Time Student 
(FAC/FTS), respectively. Furthermore, some universities had built a full-time 
operating team to promote their official account while others had not. Those official 
accounts with full time operating team published more articles and closely follow 
their fans’ interests. I therefore included Number of Articles Published (NAP), 
Number of Clicks (NC), and Number of Shares (NS) as control variables. Lastly, 
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211-985 was introduced as a normal control variable and defined it to be valued 2 
if a sample university was included in the 985 list, 1 if included in the 211 list, and 
0 if neither. All descriptive and correlation statistics were shown in Table 3-3.  
A few direct observations deserve to be mentioned here. First, the government 
support among different colleges and universities varies significantly, per student-
year total subsidies ranges from a minor 336.99 RMB (GS min) to a hefty 
101,055.76 RMB (GS max), with a standard deviation of 6,837.51. Second, the 
final score (S) calculated by BCU ranges from 23.9 to 94.0, while the mean of it is 
just 34.8. Dig a bit further into the distribution of the scores, one will find that from 
the very top to the 10th, S dropped from 94 to 61.6 or a 32.4 decrease; while from 
number 490 to number 500, S dropped from 24.3 to 23.9, a mere 0.4 decrease. The 
skewed scores reflect the fact that research capacities are highly concentrated in a 
handful number of research universities, while the rest may not even get a fair 
chance to compete. A third observation would be the vast difference in AT, the 
proportion of active ties, with a min of 0.00 to a max of 0.84, and a mean of 0.23. 
My direct interpretation is that for the extreme of mismanaged WPP account, almost 
all fans are so-called social “zombies”. In contrast, the best managed WPP account 
maintained an overwhelmingly 84% of all its followers actively contact the 
college/university through social network platforms. While on average, the 
“zombie” to “activist” ratio is about 3 to 1. Last but not least, the geographic 
distribution of freshly graduated students among different universities vastly varied. 
The min of COUNT is 2, and the max is 349. That is, for the mostly new-alumni-
geo-concentrated Chinese tertiary education institutes, its students migrated to only 

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two cities, while for the wildly broadcasting universities, their students migrated 
literally to all over China (the total number of municipals I included in the full list 
is 351). Based on these sketchy facts, one can already develop a broad view of how 
the Chinese higher education landscape looks like.  
As to the correlation matrix, one fact needs to be taken care of. It is not surprising 
to see that the two measures of University Ranking, the position number (N) and 
final score (S) are negatively and highly significantly correlated (correlation 
coefficient= - 0.866, p < 0.01). The ranking is based on the final scores, and the 
higher the score, the higher the ranking of a university, the smaller the position 
number of that university. Although both valid measures, include both in a single 
regression model may cause serious problems. I therefore conclude it would be 
proper to enter these two measures separately into different regressions. 



Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Min Max Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.GS 336.99  101000  5477.90  6837.51                
2.N 1.00  500.00  249.38  144.01  -.351**             
3.S 23.90 94.00 34.85 9.25 .334** -.866**      
4.AT 0.00  0.84  0.23  0.20  .140* -.138** .154**         
5.DN 0.00 27.76 0.53 1.69 .026 -.159** .216** .100    
6.HHI 0.06 0.95 0.34 0.13 .037 -.098* .105** .050 -.012   
7.COUNT 2.00 349.00 222.94 83.01 .049 -.318** .337** .179** .114* -.381**  
8.GFA 0.79  163.82  19.75  11.83  .284** -.402** .521** .085 .096 .140** .075 
9.NGS/FTS 0.00  6.15  0.20  0.40  .373** -.487** .589** .194** .194** .007 .121* 
10.FAC/FTS 0.00  0.96  0.08  0.06  .347** -.370** .379** .062 .076 .068 -.051 
11.NAP 0.00  1361.00  154.27  225.63  .066 -.350** .500** .449** .285** .066 .239** 
12.NC 1.13  2671.16  257.99  323.18  .022 -.004 .042 .473** .110 .049 .054 
13.NS 0.00  16.00  0.09  0.88  -.031 .076 -.050 -.078 -.016 .005 -.043 
14.211-985 0.00  2.00  0.29  0.60  .246** -.625** .796** .209** .261** .015 .358** 
**. Significant at 0.01 level (p< 0.01, 2-tailed); 
*. Significant at 0.05 level (p< 0.05, 2-tailed). 
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Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (cont.) 

8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.GS            
2.N         
3.S       
4.AT         
5.DN       
6.HHI       
7.COUNT       
8.GFA        
9.NGS/FTS .452**       
10.FAC/FTS .410** .753**      
11.NAP .223** .444**  .208**    
12.NC .014 .055  -.030 .132*   
13.NS -.057 -.049  -.043 -.045 -.012  
14.211-985 .386** -.038 .261** .408** .033 -.038 
**. Significant at 0.01 level (p< 0.01, 2-tailed); 
*. Significant at 0.05 level (p< 0.05, 2-tailed). 
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c) Regression Models 
I chose Ordinary Least Square Regression Models to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Despite the availability of sophisticated models nowadays, OLS regression still 
gains many and much favorability for at least two reasons. Namely, it is simple and 
easy to apply, and robust in most cases. Arguably OLS regression may lead to 
significant bias problem in small sample test. But the number of my estimation 
surely past the rule of thumb with a sample size large enough to meet the request 
of OLS regression.  
I applied seven empirical models to test all the proposed hypotheses step by step. 
Model 1 is the baseline model that contains only control variables. Model 2 added 
the focal construct of this research, the University Ranking measured by N, into the 
regression. Model 3 adds two more focal independents measuring the “Active 
Connections” in SIM into the regression, i.e., density of social network (DN) and 
active ties (AT). Both DN and AT aim to capture the characteristics of the 
digitalized social network that a tertiary education institute tries hard to maintain. 
Model 4 included two more variables measuring the “Social Footprint” of a 
college/university. COUNT values geographically how broad its graduates had 
touched, while HHI specifies the concentration of distribution among those cities 
its graduates had touched. In Model 5, I tested the possibility of a potential curved 
relationship between N and GS by adding the quadratic term of N into the 
regression. Model 6 tested the moderating effects of “Active Connections” on the 
relations between N and GS by adding two interactive terms, i.e., DN*N and AT*N. 
Finally, Model 7 is the full-flung all-factor regression with another set of potential 


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moderating effects—the potential of “Social Footprint” moderates the relations 
between N and GS identified by the interactive terms COUNT*N and HHI*N —
included. I then replaced N with S and repeated regression from Model 2 to Model 
7, results were largely the same as those of Models containing N and were 
summarized in Appendix 2. Here I focus on discussing the regression results based 
on N instead of S. 
 
5. Discussion of Results 
Table 3-4 shows the regression results of all seven empirical models. Model 1, or 
the baseline model with controls only, is itself interesting. It shows that two controls, 
NGS/FTS and FAC/FTS, positively and significantly affected GS (p<0.01). That is, 
a university with a large number of postgraduates and faculties relative to full time 
undergraduate students, a typical feature of research universities, were more likely 
to get more funds from the Chinese government than those teaching-oriented 
schools. In other words, I found evidence that, as Qian (2016) worried, the Chinese 
government favored research universities over teaching universities. Another two 
controls, the coefficients of Gross Floor Area (GFA) and the inclusion in elite 
institute project 211 or 985, 211-985, are positive and marginally significant (p<0.1). 
As such, the larger the size of a university’s campus, the more the public fund had 
been directed to it. It is understandable, since all lands in China are state-owned, 
the campus size surely indicates some kind of government preferences. Moreover, 
the inclusion in elite programs really helps. As estimated according to the 
regression, inclusion into 211 added about 920.4 RMB per student per year, and the 

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inclusion of the upgrade version of 211, the 985 project, brought another 920.4 
RMB into a research university’s funding. It is clear that the research universities 
with relatively large campus, high faculty ratio and more post-graduates, included 
in elite education promotion projects are favorable in the Chinese higher education 
system. 
		

 
Table 3-4: Models and Regression Results 
 
 
Model 1 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 3 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 4 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant .463** (.123) .891** (.188) .812** (.190) .957** (.318) 
GFA .008̈ (.005) .006 (.005) .007 (.005) .007 (.005) 
NGS/FTS .503** (.190) .453* (.189) .460* (.188) .460* (.189) 
FAC/FTS 3.210** (1.054) 2.863** (1.052) 2.853** (1.048) 2.759** (1.064) 
NAP .000 (.000) .000̈ (.000) -.001* (.000) -.001* (.000) 
NC .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
NS -.021 (.061) -.013 (.061) -.002 (.061) -.003 (.061) 
211-985 .168̈ (.091) .021 (.103) .008 (.104) .019 (.106) 
N 
  
-.001** (.000) -.001** (.000) .001** (.000) 
AT 
    
.787* (.317) .801* (.319) 
DN     -.004 (.035) -.005 (.035) 
HHI       -.113 .375 
COUNT       .000 .001 
N*N         
AT*N 
      
  
DN*N         
HHI*N         
COUNT*N         
R2 .152 .168 .178 .179 
F 12.645** 12.360** 10.601** 8.836** 
n 500 500 500 500 
**. Significant at 0.01 level (p< 0.01); 
*. Significant at 0.05 level (p< 0.05). 
̈. Significant at 0.1 level (p< 0.1). 
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Table 3-4: Models and Regression Results (cont.) 
 
 
Model 5 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 6 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 7 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant 1.455** (.411) 1.259** (.421) 1.546* (.651) 
GFA .006 (.005) .007 (.005) .006 (.005) 
NGS/FTS .421* (.189) .460* (.190) .456* (.192) 
FAC/FTS 2.576* (1.065) 2.504** (1.065) 2.366* (1.082) 
NAP -.001** (.000) -.001** (.000) -.001** (.000) 
NC .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 .000 
NS .000 (.061) -.004 (.061) -.005 .061 
211-985 -.128 (.131) -.159 (.132) -.125 (.140) 
N -.005* (.002) -.004* (.002) -.005̈ (.003) 
AT .859** (.319) 1.730** (.515) 1.724** (.517) 
DN .001 (.035) -.069 (.074) -.069 (.074) 
HHI -.166 (.375) -.118 (.375) -.177 (.815) 
COUNT .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.001 .002 
N*N .000̈ (.000) .000̈ (.000) .000̈ (.000) 
AT*N 
  
-.004* (.002) -.004* (.002) 
DN*N   .001 (.001) .001 (.001) 
HHI*N     .000 (.003) 
COUNT*N     .000 (.000) 
R2 .185 .194 .195 
F 8.483** 7.746** 6.849** 
n 500 500 500 
**. Significant at 0.01 level (p< 0.01); 
*. Significant at 0.05 level (p< 0.05). 
̈. Significant at 0.1 level (p< 0.1). 
 
 
Model 2 includes the focal of this research, the university ranking number N, into 
the regression. As expected, the regression coefficient of N is significant (p<0.01) 
and negative. The higher the ranking of a college/university, the lower the N, the 
more fund it obtains from the government. As such, I found support for Hypothesis 
1. Indeed, the university rankings have made a visible impact on the public fund 
allocation under the context of China. The coefficient of a -0.0012, can be translated 
	

into an amount of 6.8 RMB per student per year increase of government fund for a 
college/university moves one position up in the ranking list.  
Model 3 includes another focal of my research, the measures of impact for “Active 
Connections” listed in SIM into the regression. The regression coefficient of active 
ties (AT), the ratio of active fans over the total number of registered followers of a 
college/university’s official WPP account, is positive and significant at 95% 
confidence intervals (p<0.05). However, the regression coefficient of density of 
network (DN) is negative and insignificant (p=0.904). Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is 
supported in that the higher the portion of active fans on the major digital social 
platform, the more likely it obtains more funds from the government, while DN 
does not significantly affect GS. Model 4 tested the relation between social 
footprint and government supports. However, neither of the regression coefficients 
of the two measures of social footprint, HHI and COUNT are significant. Moreover, 
the signs of these two coefficients are negative, which contradict to the theoretical 
prediction, that the broader the geographic touch of a tertiary education institute, 
the more favor it gains from the government; that the more concentrated of a 
college/university’s fresh graduates, the more support it obtains from the 
government. The regression results predicted the opposite, although insignificant. 
It is, therefore, clear that I found no support for Hypothesis 2b.  
Model 5 added the quadratic term of N into the regression to test the curvilinear 
relationship between university ranking and public fund allocation. The coefficient 
of this quadratic term is positive and marginally significant (p<0.1), which is 
partially supported Hypothesis 3. That is, a university’s performance judged by 
	
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rankings enjoys a marginally significant “increasing return”, that the higher its 
ranking, the higher the amount it would receive from the government when its 
ranking performance improves. Interestingly, the coefficient of N decreased from -
0.001 in Model 2 to -0.005. That is, for the colleges/universities positioned at the 
very top end of those ranking, say, an improvement from No. 2 to No. 1, will bring 
in 27.0 RMB per student per year, rather than the 6.8 RMB predicted in Model 2. 
Figure 3-3 visualized the curvilinear relationship between N and GS, according to 
the regression results of Model 5. 
 
Figure 3-3: Curvilinear Relationship between N and GS 
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Model 6 and 7 count in the two sets of interaction terms into regression. The 
regression coefficient of the AT*N is significant (p<0.05) and with a sign consistent 
with Hypothesis 4a. However, the coefficients of the other three coefficient terms, 
DN*N, COUNT*N, and HHI*N are all insignificant. As such, I failed to find 
supports to Hypothesis 4b. Figure 3-4 visualized the moderating effect of AT, 
according to the regression results of Model 6. 
Figure 3-4: Moderating Effect of AT 
 

 
 
6. Conclusions and Remarks 
In this paper, I advanced our understanding of how public resources were allocated 
among universities theoretically and empirically. This work contributed to the 
existing literature by elaborating the impact the features of a social network on 
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public policy making. Indeed, not only firms and individuals, but public policy 
makers are embedded in and shared with such a social network. This research 
therefore extended the research scope of social network theories and paved the way 
to a holistic view of social-relational theory. Empirically, as to my knowledge, this 
is the first attempt to systematically review and test the impact of university ranking 
on public policy making.  
Combining all the results from the 7 OLS regressions, I found support for 
Hypothesis 1, 2a, 3, 4a, and no support for Hypothesis 2b and 4b. It is clear that 
under the Chinese context, not only the government supports play an important role 
in financing the higher education sector, but the distribution of such supports is 
uneven with a consistent favor towards large comprehensive research universities. 
University ranking indeed influenced how the government allocates its public 
support among tertiary institutes. The presented evidence was consistent with the 
worries, although university rankings were subject to many controversies, it played 
an important role in determining how much governmental fund a university could 
obtain under the context of modern China.  
Moreover, as suggested by SIM paradigm of the higher education institutes, the 
social impact, as a general strategic intent of a college/university, justifies its 
qualifications for public fund and other supports. Not only that the mobile internet 
has penetrated into Chinese people’s daily life, but it also attracts attention from 
institute to maintain an active network to continuously contact a large relevant 
audience. Through the dataset based on two mostly used mobile platforms, WPP 
and MMLT, I pictured in detail a college/university’s social network in general, and 
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fresh graduates in particular—how active are its digitalized followers and those 
graduates’ whereabouts. Constructs and measures based on these datasets shed 
lights on how social network features moderated the impact of Rankings on public 
fund allocation. If one takes university ranking as an at the most incomplete and 
sometimes wrong indication of reputation, then social networks surround a 
college/university indeed help to disseminate the good news while detaining the 
bad ones.  
However, not all measures worked. There could be a few possibilities why 
geographic distribution measures turned out to be all insignificant. Firstly, the 
measure HHI and COUNT may have missed some critical characteristics of the 
geographic distribution of a college/university’s fresh graduates. For example, 
those fresh graduates may yet to be settled to a particular city and the possibility of 
them moving to another city is much higher than those who have graduated for a 
few years. Secondly, the distribution of graduates from large well-established 
research universities and that of those from specialized local schools could be quite 
different. The former is quite similar that a majority of top schools’ graduates, often 
over the 50% mark, move to first-tier cities in China. The latter, however, may differ 
significantly—some spread all over China while others concentrated in hometown. 
Therefore, a more prudent measure would separate the sample in two or more 
tranches then study the character of distribution within and across those tranches. 
Lastly, the sample itself is limited and skewed, since the Chinese higher education 
system had a unique historical path of development, and the 500 sample is merely 
a subset of all 1,245 degree-granting higher education institutes, and systematically 
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biased toward large research universities. Indeed, for all these 500, only one is 
privately held, all the other 499 are public colleges/universities9.  
Therefore, I caution further extension and generalization of our findings into other 
countries. My data source and sample universities were all from China, and the 
Chinese government played a unique role in promoting the global university 
ranking practice and the concept of WCU. The aim of ARWU was basically to help 
the Ministry of Education of China to better evaluate the performance of Chinese 
universities at the beginning. Then the Chinese government took it seriously and 
changed its policies accordingly, which in turn gave much momentum and policy 
influence of ARWU. As such, the ranking business may have a definite impact on 
public policy under the context of China. Moreover, the Chinese culture was 
defined as a kin-based social network and practical collectivism. Therefore, the 
relational ties often serve as a particularly strong mechanism in delivering 
reputational signals. It remains unclear if what I found in this research could and 
should be extended to other nations and cultures. I expect future research can fill in 
this gap. 
 
 
  

9 The only exception is Duke Kunshan University. 
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CHAPTER IV:  
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS 
 
The higher education sector has been picked up and criticized recently. Opponents 
posited an ideology shift from regarding higher education as a public good to a 
market- and competition-oriented view to see education as a commodity to be 
consumed by students at their own expenses. Public universities may have obtained 
a same empire-building syndrome like the conglomerates in the corporate sector 
and need to reform all the establishments such as tenure, curriculums, and 
departmentalization. University rankings were not making things any easier for 
tertiary education institutes, since research results are now the priority of moving 
up the ranking ladder.  
In this thesis, I have studied the recent developments in the higher education sector 
and put special attention on the merit of those critiques. Some of the critiques have 
missed the mark. It is clear that the two main products of higher education institutes, 
high quality labor and academic publications, are quasi-public goods or public 
goods. Other critiques are more complex to conclude. The expansion of higher 
education institutes, on the one hand, maybe a side-effect of government agencies’ 
eagerness to maximize the outputs of knowledge creation, therefore centered 
research university at the core of their development strategy. On the other hand, 



besides academic publications, government agencies do not have a more objective 
base to assess the merit of a college/university, which leads to the asymmetric and 
undeserved influence on public policies from third-party rankings. These critiques 
correctly pointed to the problem but did not provide a solution.   
I proposed a framework to decipher the behaviors one observed lately of higher 
education institutes. I called it Structure-Intent-Match Model, or SIM Model in 
short. Under SIM, a college/university sets its strategic intents to live up with its 
multiple stakeholders’ expectations. These goals often contain two conflicting 
components, one is financially driven profitability and sustainability, the other is 
socially favorable like positive externalities, social footprint, and active 
connections. The college/university develops its organizational structure, including 
legal status, disciplines, and sectors to match its prioritized strategic intents. As 
such, for a public or nonprofit school whose main stakeholders are government 
agencies or strategic donors, it is natural for it to prioritize the research over 
teaching to push up its position in ranking. A dual-role bi-sector structure of 
research university originated from Germany, matured and modernized in the US 
become the role model globally. Indeed, although often a subject of criticism, such 
as undergraduates constantly suffer from faster increasing tuition fees which result 
in high level of dropouts and ballooning student debts (Stiglitz, 2016), the US 
higher education system is envied as well as modeled by peer systems all over the 
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world.  
Recognizing the importance of higher education sector in building up a knowledge-
based economy, governments from emerging economies are eager to follow the US 
model. The Chinese government, since the starting of the new millennium, has 
pushed quite a few multi-billion-dollar plans to promote the research function of 
top Chinese universities. Moreover, the Chinese government had become a major 
promoter for university rankings, and in fact was behind one of the most influential 
rankings, the ARWU. I have shown evidence that the ranking—a sub-ranking 
dedicates to Chinese universities in particular—significantly affects the allocation 
of public fund as the higher the ranking the more fund a higher education institute 
obtains. Moreover, such a favor is increasingly more toward the top, the higher the 
position in the ranking, the larger the difference in public funding. Indeed, rankings 
swayed many Chinese universities from its strategic focus and to put academic 
research and publications ahead of teaching as the most prominent task of a research 
university. Following this line of argument, university rankings are setting up an 
inappropriate model for higher education institutes in general, for almost all top 
ranked institutes are bi-sectoral and multi-divisional organizations. A close look at 
the matrices of indices underlying the rankings would show that specialized 
colleges and other dedicated postsecondary institutes are systematically 
disadvantaged in those measurements. Nonetheless, rankings still legitimized and 
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empowered the conglomeration trends of the Chinese higher education system. 
 
Contributions  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, following a 
rich tradition, I included the social perspective into economic analysis, and 
proposed a new paradigm that can be generalized and fit in multiple sectors. 
Previous studies that theorize tertiary education institutes often focus on a specific 
sector, namely the new flagship universities or specialized schools. While the SIM 
model could be easily extended into almost all kinds of educational institutes. 
Moreover, the factors listed in SIM, such as profitability, sustainability, social 
footprint, and active connections, are measurable and with substantial empirical 
potentials. As such, the SIM model could be served as an important alternative to 
existing ranking or other scoring methods in assessing the performance of higher 
education institutes. 
Secondly, I compiled two unique datasets that have based on mobile internet 
sources. One is about the features of the WPP official accounts of thousands of 
higher education institutes. Another is an aggregated migration dataset of all 
degree-grant institutes’ freshly graduates. These two datasets are complicated in 
nature and clear-cut in structure. That is, both of them have gone through a 
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complicated process from drill, tag, cleanse, and reconstruction to get a clear 
meaning and ready to be entered into empirical tests. I, with the help of technicians 
from Tencent, whom I thanked in the acknowledgement, took the pain to bend the 
messily huge and hugely messy big data into something comprehensible. Not only 
I see a large potential in these two, but the methodology of creating these two can 
be easily generalized in making other structured vectors from messy big data from 
the internet. 
Lastly, I made some progress in advance our understanding of the impact of social 
network containing personal ties. With the help of recent trends of shifting from 
offline to online, personal ties are much more digitalized than a decade ago. This 
trend thus provides us a unique opportunity to get into the real sense of how 
personal ties would look like in the real world. It is also based on this possibility, 
that I have been able to propose a comprehensive measurement of a previously 
omitted variable.  
 
Remarks 
Reflecting on the theoretical framework and empirical results that I have shown in 
this thesis; three suggestions are ready to be taken away. Firstly, one has to admit, 
that with or without the rankings, US higher education system does have merit, and 
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emerging economies like China have much to learn from US and other advanced 
tertiary systems. However, the learning should start from recognizing the true 
success factor, not simply copy the performance matrices. As suggested by multiple 
scholars, the success of US higher education system is not only because of 
celebrated faculties and advances in pushing the knowledge boundaries of humanity, 
but also because this system outperforms by addressing urgent social needs—when 
millions of poor and bankrupted young soldiers return from the battlefield, 
American universities efficiently translate them from weapon to labor in a short 
period of time; innovations ranging from internet to vaccines and biomatters feed 
into the economy as new growth engines. Social benefits of a college/university 
often overweight its direct economic value. To serve the public interests is at the 
core of a true university.  
Secondly, policy makers should take the university ranking at caution. That is, 
before jumping into the conclusion, pay some attention to how the score was 
attached to a specific higher education institute, and balanced the scoring method 
with commonsense. Rankings, although with merits, may have gained too much 
power in directing public policies, as shown by the empirical evidences I presented 
in Chapter 3. Based on public fund does not necessarily exempt 
colleges/universities from competition, but rather a competition based on different 
parameters. The critique about public provision of private good is rather a critique 
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of the perceived inefficiency in government-guided merit-based resource allocation 
mechanism, compared with the efficiency-based market mechanism. Do not simply 
judge the value of a higher education institute solely based on its score but take its 
social value into consideration. How broadly a university has touched the locals 
geographically? How active are the alumni after years of graduation and how such 
a network would help a college/university building up its reputation within an 
economy? 
Last but not the least, take note of the complexity of higher education system. 
Research universities are the stars of the system, but only looking at them will never 
get policy makers the whole picture of a higher education system. Rankings, in this 
sense, function well in helping colleges and universities to get government attention. 
SIM model, in contrast, provides a holistic approach to interpret the diversity of 
higher education institutes not only in their structure but also their performance. 
Through the lens of SIM framework, the dilemmas associated with public provision 
of private goods and the tradeoff between size and complexity are nothing but 
rational choices under different propositions of strategic intent. 
In concluding this thesis, I hope my piece of work is to encourage a constructive 
dialogue on the types of metrics that capture this broader influence of higher 
education. This thesis marks the start to achieve this mission, not to put an end on 
it. I also caution the generalization of the empirical results obtained under China 
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context. Other economies may face totally different challenges and should develop 
their own merit-based evaluation system when it comes to the allocation of public 
fund among higher education institutes. However, I hope the SIM framework does 
help policy makers to come up with better public plans for colleges and universities.  
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Appendix 1: A Survey on WPP Account of Higher Education Institutes 
 
The research investigates fan groups interacting with universities’ Official 
Accounts. We analyze the characteristics of the messages they left, and then the 
identities of those senders. Based on the materials we collected, the characteristics 
of digitalized social network surrounds a college/university emerges. 
13 Official Accounts were randomly selected from ‘The top 300 of Tencent 
universities campus influence ranking list (2017.7-2018.10)’ piled up by WeSchool, 
a branch of Tencent. We left them a message identifying ourselves and our intention 
to conduct a survey. 10 of them responded positively. We then interviewed the 
operators/administrators behind these WPP accounts, either through the phone or 
in person. We obtained the record with the consent of our interviewees.  
Followings are our conclusions based on the analysis of data. In general, we found 
that the social network of universities’ Official Accounts presents the following two 
characteristics: 
Ⅰ. The fan base of different WPP Official Accounts are mostly students, alumni, 
faculties, and families.  
We categorized the fan base into the following groups: university students, alumni, 
students’ parents, teachers, random-visitors and unrelated followers (other new 
media team in colleges, enterprises who have the intention to cooperate with 
colleges, government education departments, candidates from other schools). The 
student groups (students and alumni) contact with the Official Accounts the most. 
 Ⅱ. Fans’ messages have distinct real-life characteristics. 
Messages left by groups with different identity tags have distinct characteristics. 
Some of the messages even show their own identities directly. The characteristics 
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of students' messages can be divided into two parts: One is about the sharing of 
school life experience and active participation in the discussion of passage contents, 
such as "I just took the campus shuttle a few days ago" and "the campus card is 
very convenient and it works well". The other is about the comments on current 
events in schools and they will give their own constructive advice. 
The characteristics of alumina’s messages can be summarized into two points: One 
is about the memories of the past campus life, such as "when I was in school" and 
"I miss the alma mater ". The words like “miss” and “memory” are mentioned many 
times. The other will express heartfelt wishes when the school has made great 
achievements. 
The teachers' messages are more formal, some of them will directly show their 
identities. There is a kind of message interpreting the policy by teachers which can 
help students to understand a school policy in depth. The other category is about 
wishes and congratulations to colleagues. 
The messages of the parents are less, some of them even may clearly contain words 
like "my child/son/daughter", which can be easily identified. One kind of these 
messages is to ask for advice on the university from June to August. The other 
concentrates on school activities, such as encouragement to children during military 
training and blessing to the school during the celebration. 
Other publics which constitutes more complex parts are more difficult to identify. 
The other school candidates' messages will express their yearning for entering this 
school and hope to study there in the future. A new media of other colleges will 
show their identity directly in the message, and the message is mainly about 
learning experience and celebration. Business partners will ask in the message 
whether commercial advertising cooperation can be allowed. Table A1-1 
summarized our interviews.  
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Table A1-1: Interview Summary 
 
School Name 
Official 
Accounts 
Fans Group Proportion Descriptions 
ZHUHAI 
COLLEGE OF 
JILIN 
UNIVERSITY 
jzdwxcb 
 students and teachers 30% 
Most are about school life, such as "I took the campus bus a few 
days ago", "the campus card is very convenient and it works 
well" 
alumni 50% Most of them show their nostalgia for campus life 
students' parents 10% Most are evaluations, such as "What a great school" 
 Publics 10% 
Some will show their identities directly, "We are the new media 
of other schools, and I think your school have done a excellent 
job!" 
Fujian Agriculture 
and Forestry 
University 
fafuxtw 
our school students  >80% 
They participate actively in the topic of the school's content. For 
example, The Official Accounts posted photos of the school's 
scenery and a student will left the message, "I have seen it 
before in somewhere." 
alumni 10% They will show their nostalgia for campus life 
teachers 
5% 
Teachers tend to leave positive comments on ceremony or 
popular social events, such as the commemoration of "Yan 
Jiaqing activity of our school" 
students' parents Almost no message 
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other school students <4% 
The number of the message is not too much, which can be 
judged by the message like "I like something in this campus" 
Jiangxi University 
of Science and 
Technology 
JXUST1958 
our school students  
most are 
students and 
teachers 
One category is critical advice, the other category is positive 
comment about current events at the school. 
alumni Blessing messages 
teachers 
They leave messages concerning important school events and 
show their identities. Some of the comments on their own 
teaching content. 
students' parents 
They care more about their children, For example, In the school 
open day, there was a message "Thanks to Jiangxi University of 
Science and Technology, the child has a good life in the 
university ". 
 publics 
They may show their identities at the end of the message. For 
example, they will leave messages to express their best wishes 
to school in decoration day. 
Shenzhen 
University 
szuwhy 
our school students  40% 
They will share the life experience and show their pride of being 
a member of SZU 
alumni 50% Blessing messages 
students' parents 7% 
Messages are generally concerned about the content of the 
application, such as "How about the accommodation?" 
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teachers 3% 
When the school's new policy comes out, they will express their 
own opinions and explain the policy to the students. 
Shen Zhen 
Polytechnic 
SZPT1993 
our school students  30% 
They will comment on the current quality of the school and give 
suggestions. 
alumni 50% 
The main words in the message are "miss" and "memory". 
There will be words such as "when I was in school..."  
students' parents <10% 
Comments are mainly based on evaluation, such as "thanks the 
school for bringing up excellent children", some of which will 
be specific to a name. 
teachers 10% 
Wishes, such as "Best wishes to the school and hope it has a 
better future " 
 public 10% 
Other schools will directly bring their own school name when 
say hello. Businessmen will ask if they can deliver 
advertisements on Official Accounts. 
Communication 
University of 
Zhejiang 
zjicmqm 
our school students  
most are 
students and 
teachers 
They will resonate with the content of the article or make 
suggestions to the school. 
teachers 
Messages are more official. In the articles related to the course 
selection, they will point out the wrong course information in 
the message. 
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students' parents 
Usually they rarely leave messages, but messages mostly 
include "What about my son / daughter?" 
enterprises 
Messages usually have words like "I want to cooperate with 
you" 
Zhengzhou 
University of 
Aeronautics 
zuaweixin 
our school students  
most are 
students  
Blessing messages 
alumni 
They will express their wishes, expectations and memories of 
their alma mater. 
students' parents 
During the military training period, they will pay attention to it. 
Most of the messages are encouragement to children, and some 
activities in schools will also receive blessed messages from 
parents. 
teachers 
They seldom leave messages. Generally, under the promotion 
or commendation of a teacher, they will leave praise messages. 
others The message has no obvious characteristics 
Zhejiang Normal 
University 
ZJNU1956 
teachers 
incalculable 
The message has no obvious characteristics 
alumni 
Messages mainly express nostalgia, such as "I haven't come 
back for many years", "I miss Zhejiang Normal University", "I 
haven't eaten Beimen snacks for a long time". 
students' parents 
Words like "my child" and "my daughter" are used in the 
message. 
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our school students  Messages are related to school life 
other school students 
They will express their yearning for the entrance examination 
to Zhejiang Normal University: "I want to come to Zhejiang 
Normal University very much" and "I want to come to Zhejiang 
Normal University to have a look." 
Science and 
Technology 
College of NCHU 
gh_297475f1c
12a 
our school students  
most are 
students and 
teachers 
Contents related to school learning and life 
alumni Emotional and school-resonant contents 
students' parents Contents related to children's living and learning environment 
teachers Almost no message 
 publics The message has no obvious characteristics 
Sichuan Normal 
University 
sicnu_dy 
our school students  40%-50% The message has no obvious characteristics 
alumni 20%-30% 
They will show their nostalgia for campus life like "I deeply 
want to go back campus"  
teachers 20% Almost no message 
students' parents 20% 
They focus on the child. For example, "send more academic 
research to cultivate better students"; They may also pay more 
attention to the reality of military training 
others 10% Almost no message 
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Appendix 2: Regression Results Based on S 
 
 
Model 2’ 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 3’ 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 4’ 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 5’ 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant .035 (.279) -.175 (.289) -.125 (.326) -1.258* (.546) 
GFA .006 (.005) .006 (.005) .006 (.005) .007 (.005) 
NGS/FTS .419* (.196) .406* (.195) .403* (.196) .513** (.200) 
FAC/FTS 3.181** (1.052) 3.171** (1.046) 3.126** (1.060) 2.429* (1.008) 
NAP -.001* (.000) -.001** (.000) -.001** (.000) -.001* (.000) 
NC .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
NS -.020 (.061) -.008 (.061) -.008 (.061) -.004 (.061) 
211-985 .025 (.123) -.024 (.125) -.020 (.127) -.023 (.126) 
S .016̈ (.009) .020* (.009) .021* (.010) .081** (.025) 
AT 
  
.876** (.323) .888* (.326) .726* (.330) 
DN   -.004 (.035) -.004 (.035) .000 (.035) 
HHI     -.072 (.379) -.106 (.377) 
COUNT     .000 (.001) .000 (.001) 
S*S       -.001** (.000) 
AT*S 
      
  
DN*S         
HHI*S         
COUNT*S         
R2 .158 .170 .170 .182 
F 11.474** 10.027** 8.335** 8.296** 
n 500 500 500 500 
**. Significant at 0.01 level (p< 0.01); 
*. Significant at 0.05 level (p< 0.05). 
̈. Significant at 0.1 level (p< 0.1). 
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(cont.) 
 
 
Model 6’ 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Model 7’ 
Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant -1.441* (688) -1.347 (1.001) 
GFA .007 (.005) .007 (.005) 
NGS/FTS .527** (.200) .534** (.205) 
FAC/FTS 2.395* (1.089) 2.333* (1.100) 
NAP -.001* (.000) -.001* (.000) 
NC .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
NS -.006 (.061) -.006 (.061) 
211-985 -.044 (.136) -.025 (.147) 
S .095** (.035) .094* (.037) 
AT -.468 (1.019) -.469 (1.039) 
DN -.134 (.240) -.158 (.074) 
HHI -.080 (.378) -.747 (1.644) 
COUNT .000 (.001) .000 (.003) 
S*S -.001* (.000) -.001̈ (.001) 
AT*S .035 (.028) .035 (.028) 
DN*S .003 (.006) .004 (.006) 
HHI*S   .020 (.048) 
COUNT*S   .000 (.000) 
R2 .185 .185 
F 7.324** 6.453** 
n 500 500 
**. Significant at 0.01 level (p< 0.01); 
*. Significant at 0.05 level (p< 0.05). 
̈. Significant at 0.1 level (p< 0.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
